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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction in this C< >urt arises under I Jl i ih Code \ i n i Sec: 78 \ 3 102( I); ind 78 \ -3
i <

» 2 ( j ) .

. - •

••

-

;

-

•

•

- • • •

•

-

; • • -

•

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly apply the Dolan "rough proportionality" takings test, and the
Utah Supreme Court •> -oughequiv alei :sc) "test, ii ldetei i nil iii igtl latnoi n ICOI istiti ltioi lal taking
ml \m\ fid1 pn>|vii\ without |iiil compensation occurred under the United States or Utah
constitutions when the County required BAM to dedicate an additional thirteen feet of road
width property for future road-widening as a condition of approxmg K 0 ; proposed
subdivision?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
BAM incorrectly states the applicable standard of appellate review. While BAM asserts
that the standard of appellate review is "correctness," whether the trial court correctly applied
alegal lamlaid I'M p;)iliuil.ii Vicinal 'liulnni, r>, .t qui'sliu'i M1' fart re\ io\u*d ! | n dr' • "\ 'rally
I

^ st . leiard of appellate review. 1 Even with respect to constitutional issues, such as

-

whether due process was provided in a particular situation, the clearly-erroneous standard
applies to the "necessary subsidiary factual determinations."

vV hethei a trial court has uti n/cd

1

UTAHR. Civ. P. 52(a)("Findings of fact...shall noi b, set aside unless clearly
erroneous,., ."), Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 25, 100 I* ni ! ™.
2

Chen \. vcuun.^-

••

< ^1 25, 1 30 I 3 1 11 ;!" ;
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the correct legal standard is a question of law reviewed for correctness on appeal.3 However,
the issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly applied the "rough
proportionality" and "rough equivalency" judicial takings test to the particular facts of this case.
Even if the "rough proportionality" standard is viewed as a mixed question of law and fact, the
clearly erroneous standard will be applied to the subsidiary factual questions.4
Under a "clearly erroneous" standard, the appellate court will not set aside a trial court's
findings of fact unless "the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence."5

3

United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT
35, til 21, 25, 140 P.3d 1200.
4

Cf. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 721,
119 S.Ct. 1624, 1644 (1999)(whether a governmental land use decision substantially
advances legitimate public interests is viewed as mixed question of fact and law); cf State
v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 35, 152 P.3d 321 ("The due process claim presents a mixed
question of fact and law that we review de novo for correctness. But we incorporate a
clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations.").
5

Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting In re Estate of
Bartell 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Utah R App v 94(a)(7))
1.

lings Below

\ , NATURE OF THE CASE:

Plaintiff/Appellant B.A.M. Development, LLC

["BAM"], a real estate developer, claims that Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake County [the
"County"] violated BAM' s constitutional guarantees ofjust compensatioi i, foi taking - : • v ate
propei t) - , b) i eqi nil it lg at i "exactiot i" of a segi i lei it of 13 \i\ l5s property w hei e it -Moms an
existing public highway as a condition of the County's approval of a proposed subdivision plan,
to-wit: a dedication oi land for future road widening.
B. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
., • ,.

.1

•

•

i 5

the

district court entered judgment against B A M on all claims. On BAM's first appeal, the Utah
Court of Appeals held in 2004 that the trial court wrongly received new evidence and that the
County had not conducted an administrative hearing on :^ ^
I-

-.in l» ;i 'kMiuii!

l |i(,k

luking^ vjiaini- JIU, -JI »; !• t

I''i'h Siipi'.Miii1 Co'irl IIKWI u'laiiln! 'hr p.iilics 1 .Tnss-potitions for

certiorari, and ultimately held in 2006 that (a) the district court had properly received the new
evidence, and (b) the "rough proportionality" test of the United States Supreme Court's

1 he original trial and appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court in this matter are referred to collectively hereinafter as "BAM I."
:""oo 11: i App>i„,i|i ', S71 1 J;i,l / i n .

'. .. • /"-'
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decisions in the Nollan and Dolan cases applied to the exaction at issue in this case8. The
Supreme Court remanded, directing the trial court to conduct a "rough proportionality review,"
taking additional evidence and considering the prior trial record.
"BAM IP: On remand, district judge Timothy Hanson tried the case a second time in
October 2006. In January 2007, the district court again held in favor of the County on all
claims, finding that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test was satisfied. BAM appealed again.
In July 2008, the Utah Supreme Court issued its original opinion9, which contained Footnote
5, reading:
"It is unclear from the record whether the maintenance of 3500 South is the
responsibility of the County or of the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT). If widening the road is UDOT's responsibility, then the County
arguably would bear no cost resulting from the development's impact, and
therefore any exaction relating to the traffic increase would exceed the Dolan
standard. If the impact does not affect the county, then it has no right to require
the developer to contribute. " (Emphasis added).
Arguing that Footnote 5 embodied poor public policy and a misapplication of Dolan, the
County petitioned for rehearing in August 2008, requesting only that Footnote 5 be deleted. In
October 2008, this court issued a final amended decision.10 The court's only change to the
decision was to delete Footnote 5.

8

2006 UT 2,fflf47-48, 128 P3d 1161.

9

2008 UT 45 (July 15, 2008, not reported in P.3d) (attached as Appendix 3).

10

2008 UT 74, 196 P.3d 601 (attached as Appendix 4).
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This court's 2008 final opinion articulated the view that in order for an in-kind exaction
of property required of a developer to be constitutional, the cost to the developer must be
"roughly equivalent" to the cost of responding to "the imposition on the community of a
proposed development"11. The case was remanded to the district court to apply this court's
"cost equivalency" analysis.
"BAMIIP':

This action was tried in district court for the third time in May 2010 in a

three-day bench trial before Honorable Kate Toomey, who dismissed BAM's claims after the
trial. Judge Toomey found the evidence demonstrated that the cost of the County's exaction
upon BAM was less than the cost of BAM's proposed development upon the community. The
district court also denied BAM's post-trial motions for new trial, to alter or amend the
judgment, and to enter additional findings of fact. BAM appealed again in November 2010 and
this court elected to retain the appeal.
B. (DETAILED) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
•

August 14, 1998 - BAM's Complaint filed in Third District Court [R. 1-13].

•

April 23 and 24, 2001 - Bench trial before Honorable Timothy R. Hanson [R.
353, 354 (internal pagination, pp. 1 - 330)].

•

June 8, 2001 - Trial court entered a Memorandum Decision finding in favor of
the County on all claims asserted in BAM's Complaint, directing County to
prepare proposed findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 247 - 252].

u

/</.,tl4.
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July 30, 2001 - Trial court entered a second Memorandum Decision finding that
(a) BAM had not timely objected to the County's proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law; and (b) the County's proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law accurately represented the court's decision [R. 258 - 259].
The same day, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
[R. 266 -273], and Judgment for Defendant [R. 274 - 275].
August 1, 2001 - BAM simultaneously filed in the trial court a "Motion for Entry
of New and/or Additional Findings" and "Motion for New Trial" [R. 276 - 279]
along with a purported "Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact"[R.. 280 - 291].
September 19, 2001 - Trial court filed a third Memorandum Decision, denying
BAM's Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for
New Trial [R. 335-337].
October 15, 2001 - Trial court entered Order denying BAM's Motion for Entry
of New and/or Additional Findings [R. 338 -340].
October 18, 2001 - BAM filed Notice of Appeal and bond [R. 341 - 344].
February 20, 2004 - Court of Appeals issued decision, BAM. Development
LLC, an Utah limited liability company v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34,
87P.3d710[R. 355A-355].
August 6, 2004 - Utah Supreme Court granted parties' cross-petitions for writs
of certiorari on three issues [R. 360-361].

- P A G E 6 O F 39Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

January 10, 2006 - Utah Supreme Court issued (amended) decision, B.AM.
Development LLC, v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT App 2, 128 P.3d 1161 ["BAM
I]. Remand was ordered for further trial proceedings "for the purpose of
conducting a rough proportionality review." Id., 2006 UT App 2, <[[48,128 P.3d
at 1171 [R. 431-445].

•

October 17, 2006 - Trial court, Honorable Timothy Hanson, conducted further
trial proceedings pursuant to remand order [R. 538-540 (internal transcript
pagination 1-177)].

•

January 11, 2007 - Trial court entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on Remand" determining the County properly applied the "rough
proportionality" test, and dismissed BAM's claims [R. 554-561].

•

February 8, 2007 - Plaintiff/Appellant BAM Development filed Notice of
Appeal [R. 564-565]. The appeal, initially transferred to the Court of Appeals,
was recalled by the Utah Supreme Court for additional oral argument and
decision. [R. 573].

•

July 15, 2008 - Utah Supreme Court issued its original decision, which included
Footnote 5. [2008 UT 45].

•

August 6, 2008 - The County filed a Petition for Rehearing, seeking deletion of
Footnote 5 from the Court's decision. BAM filed opposition brief on September
22, 2010. [Not found in Record].
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October 24, 2008 - Utah Supreme Court issued its amended (final) decision,
deleting Footnote 5. [R. 584-589; 2008 UT 74] ("BAM II").
Statement of Facts
On July 30, 1997, the County received the application and proposed plat of
BAM Development for its proposed Westridge Meadows subdivision ["the
Subdivision"] to be developed at approximately 7700 West 3500 South in
unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's proposed plat included a 40-foot
highway dedication at 3500 South Street running along the north boundary of
BAM's property. [R. 899-906; also see R. 556].
On August 26, 1997, BAM's proposed Subdivision was approved by County
engineering and development staff, subject to compliance with then-current
County road

standards, including a 40-foot wide right-of-way ["ROW"]

dedication of BAM's land abutting 3500 South street for future road width. [Id.].
The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County
Ordinance §15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27801, and the County's Transportation Master Plan. [Id.].
The County relied upon future traffic volume projections and recommendations
of the Wasatch Front Regional Council ["WFRC"] the Utah Department of
Transportation ["UDOT"] in formulating its Transportation Master Plan. The
road-width recommendations of the WFRC were based upon a long-range

- P A G E 8 O F 39Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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transportation study projecting highway capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the
year 2020. [Id.].
On or about June 10, 1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed
by the WFRC and UDOT that the currently required highway ROW for 3500
South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot half-width).
The County then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its
Transportation Master Plan. [Id.].
On or about June 15,1998, Andrea Pullos, the County's transportation engineer,
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt
Lake County roadway standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW
dedication of 3500 South street. [R. 557; also see R. 903].
On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval
to BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway ROW dedication at 3500
South Street. [Id; R. 904].
On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning Commission's
dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40-feet. BAM's
appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed
by the County. [Id.].
On July 15, 1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal
[Id.].

-PAGE9OF 39Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On June 23,1999, the County Planning Commission approved BAM's amended
subdivision plat, which had been modified by BAM to include the required 53foot highway dedication. [Id.].
On August 18,1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final approval
of the Subdivision plat with the 53-foot highway dedication. [Id.].
On August 27, 1999, the Subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision. [Id.].
In or around April, 1998, Andrea Pullos, the County transportation engineer,
conducted an analysis of historical and projected traffic volumes on 3500 South
street in the "traffic link" between 7200 West and 8400 West streets. [R. 558; R.
904].
BAM's proposed development was located within this traffic link at
approximately 7700 West.
Ms. Pullos' traffic analysis relied, in part, upon historical traffic data compiled
by UDOT reflecting increasing traffic volume on 3500 South street within the
7200 West-8400 West traffic link. [R. 558-559; R. 904].
As a result of her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that BAM's proposed
subdivision development was likely to generate an additional 440 vehicle trips
per day on 3500 South street. This calculation assumed ten (10) vehicle trips per
day per additional housing unit. [Id.].

-PAGE 10OF
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At the time BAM's application for the Subdivision was pending, local growth
and development in the Magna community generally was expected to continue,
creating increased traffic volume and congestion on 3500 South street. [Id.].
WFRC anticipates that a response to such growth will be public construction
projects to widen certain existing local roads. The approximate public cost of the
project (reduced to 1998 dollar values to provide an accurate comparison to
BAM's 1998 exaction costs) is $6,748,700.00. [Id.].
Comparing the total expected increase in traffic by the year 2020 with the portion
of vehicle trips attributable to the Subdivision, the portion of the cost of the
$6,748,700 cost directly attributable to the traffic impact likely to be created by
the Subdivision is five percent (5%), or $337,500.00, which reflects the cost to
the public of responding to the increased traffic likely to be caused by the
Subdivision. [Id.].
Based on typical highway expansion projects historically, major highway
improvements will probably be financed by a combination of governmental road
construction funding sources including federal highway aid funds and additional
state, county and/or municipal funds. [Id.].
BAM's costs incurred as a proximate result of the County's imposition of the 13foot exaction (i.e., the increase in the exaction from 40-feet to 53-feet) are as
follows:

-PAGE 11 OF 39Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

LOST LAND (decreased lot sizes for 9 highway-abutting lots):
ADDITIONAL PAVEMENT
RELOCATED POWER POLES
RE-ENGINEERING FEES
EXCAVATION, addition required by the 13-foot exaction
TREE REMOVAL required by the 13-foot exaction
Total BAM Exaction Costs:

$10,407.29
$10,140.00
$23,250.00
$12,450.00
$5,400.00
$11,175.00
$83,997.29

[R. 905,1| 19].
v.

Although BAM has challenged the entire highway ROW dedication and has
attempted to include in the exaction the incidental development costs of installing
curb and gutter, fencing, sort and sewer lines, the only issue BAM appealed to the
County Board of Commissioner's was the requirement of a 53-foot ROW
dedication rather than a 40-foot dedication. Accordingly the only issue before
the trial court was the additional 13-foot exacted by the County. [R. 905].

1.

2.

SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT
Appellant's Brief Fails to Marshal the Evidence and Cite the Record.
(A)

BAM Failed to Marshal the Evidence.

(B)

BAM Failed to Provide Citations to the Record Indicating Where Issues Were
Preserved for Appeal.

(C)

BAM Failed to Provide Citations to the Record for its Statement of the Facts.

The Trial Court Determined that the Issue Presented by This Court for Trial on Remand
Was Limited to the Additional 13-Foot Highway Dedication Exaction.

3.

The Relevant Cost of the "Impact"' of BAM's Development is that Cost Borne by the
Government Generally (i.e., the Public), Not Just that Borne by Salt Lake County.

4.

BAM's "Double Taxation" Argument Under the Banberry Case is Misguided.
-PAGE 12OF
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5.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded, Based Upon the Evidence at Trial, That the Cost
of the Exaction to BAM was Far Less that the Cost of the Impacts of BAM's
Subdivision Development to the Community.

6.

(A)

The Trial Court Correctly Determined the Cost of the Response by the
Community to BAM's Traffic Impact Based on the Evidence.

(B)

The Trial Court Correctly Determined the Cost of the Road Dedication Exaction
to BAM Based on the Evidence.

(C)

The Trial Court Correctly Applied the BAM II "Rough Equivalency" Standard.

The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Limit or Exclude the Trial Testimony of BAM's
"Rebuttal Expert Witness" Craig Smith
ARGUMENT
1
Appellant's Brief Fails to Marshal the Evidence and Cite the Record

(A) BAM Fails to Marshal the Evidence
BAM fails to comply with the briefing requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure by not marshaling evidence and citing to the record. In such circumstances, a
reviewing court should "disregard those portions of [the] brief that [are] inadequate."12
Moreover, the reviewing court may presume that the decision below was correct13 and "decline
to address its merits."14

12

Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 2004 UT 18, f 16, 89
P.3d 131.
13

Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

l4

Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997).
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BAM's brief is unclear as to whether it challenges any specific findings of fact of the
district court. BAM vaguely criticizes the trial court's factual findings, but only implicitly
argues that such findings are not supported by substantial evidence15. To the extent that BAM
asserts that argument, it must "marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing
it in a light most favorable to the court below."16 "A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged findings."17 BAM "cannot dodge this
duty by attempting to frame the issues as legal ones. Because the queslion of [rough
proportionality] is so dependent on factual findings, [BAM] must marshal the evidence if it
seeks to challenge the trial court's determination of that question."18
The trial court's ultimate holding for the County may be supported by reference to the

15

For instance, BAM continues to argue that its economic costs incurred as a result
of the exaction imposed by the County amounted to $391,000.00, despite the trial court's
Finding of Fact No. 19 {see Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Fact and Order ["Order"],
July 8, 2010 [R. 899-907], at p. 7 [R. 905]) v/hich found that BAM's "costs resulting
from the 13-foot exaction are ... $89,997.29[.]" Thus, BAM implies that the trial court's
factual determination of BAM's damages was not based on substantial evidence, but does
not quite articulate that position expressly, and certainly does not marshal the evidence
which supports the trial court's finding.
16

United Park City Mines Co, v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT
35,124, 140 P.3d 1200 (quoting State v. Clark 2005 UT 75,117, 124 P.3d 235).
17

UTAH

R. APP. P. 24(a)(9)(emphasis added).

18

Cf. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006
UT 35, ^1 25, 140 P.3d 1200 (regarding whether waiver had occurred in the circumstances;
court characterized the issue as "extremely fact-sensitive").
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whole record of evidence presented in the trial court during all three trial proceedings.19 In
Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82, If 82,100 P.3d 1177, the Utah Supreme Court clarified that even
if the trial court has erroneously referred to some aspect of the legal standard involved, if the
whole record supports the trial court's decision, then it will be upheld:
Defendants claim that there is "no evidence" supporting the trial court's findings. Their
assertion, however, does not satisfy the marshaling requirements. In situations where
there is virtually nothing in the record that would support the trial court's findings, a
claim of no evidence might be sufficient. However, an appellee need only point to a
scintilla of evidence that supports a court's findings in order to refute an appellant's claim
of no evidence (emphasis added).
BAM fails in its present appeal to marshal the evidence to establish a lack of substantial
record evidence in support of specific findings or subordinate factual matter in mixed law/fact
issues.
(B) No citations to record indicating issues were preserved for appeal
B AM's brief does not comply with UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A) which requires "citation
to the record showing that [each] issue was preserved in the trial court." Without such citation,
the reviewing court may presume that the issues involved were not properly preserved in the
trial court, and hence may properly "decline to address its merits."20
(C) No citations to record for statements of fact
In addition, BAM's brief does not comply with UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(7) which requires

19

Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, ^ 20, 124 P.3d 269
("[Only] if absolutely no evidence exists in the record to support the district court's
finding, that finding is clearly erroneous.")(Emphasis added).
20

_Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997).
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that "[a] 11 statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record ... ."21 When a brief "makes ...bald statements of fact], unaccompanied
by any relevant citation to the record," an appellate court may properly "decline to address its
merits."22 Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence in the record supports the ultimate
conclusion upholding the County's position. The Findings are merely the intermediate step.23
It is only when the ultimate conclusion is "against the clear weight of the evidence," in light of
the whole record, that a trial court decision can be held to be "clearly erroneous."24
2
The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Issue Presented by This Court for
Trial on Remand Was Limited to the Additional 13-Foot Highway Dedication
The trial before Judge Toomey was limited to BAM's claim that the County's exaction
in January 1998 of 13-feet of land to be dedicated for future highway widening on 3500 South
amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation under the
Dolan "rough equivalency" analysis.25 In BAM I, this court stated that
21

UTAHR. APP. P. 24(a)(7); West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, % 32, 135

P.3d 874.
22

Rukavina, supra, 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997).

23

See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 12, 51 P.3d 724 ("The marshaled
facts should 'correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings,'
supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record, and only then should an
appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged findings are clearly erroneous.").
24

See, e.g., Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App.

1990).
25

Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 US 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994). Dolan9 s "rough
proportionality" analysis was reformulated as a "rough equivalency" test by this court's
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[t]he court of appeals majority concluded that B.A.M. had preserved for appeal
only its objection to the County's claim to the thirteen feet of its property. In
doing so, it affirmed the trial court's conclusion that B.A.M. had never objected
to the initial forty-foot exaction in its administrative appeals before the planning
and zoning commission or the Board [of County Commissioners]. Judge Orme
dissented from this view, believing that in light of the undeveloped state of the
record the court of appeals should interpret more generously B. A.M' s contentions
that it had properly challenged the entire scope of the County's proposed property
exaction. We did not grant certiorari on this question, however, and therefore
limit our review to the thirteen foot supplemental exaction?6
(Emphasis added). Similarly, this court in BAMII stated:
Later, in accordance with changes to the County's master traffic plan, the County
told B.A.M. that it would be required to increase the street to 53 feet half-width.
This additional exaction of 13feety BAM. alleges, represents an unconstitutional
taking?1
(Emphasis added). While BAM wishes to extend the reach of the present appeal to encompass
a wide array of incidental development costs associated with its Subdivision28, this court clearly
concluded that because BAM's administrative appeal to County land-use authorities did not
challenge the original 40-foot exaction, only the additional (or "supplemental") 13-foot

second decision in this action, under which a trial court must compare (a) the monetary
cost of a government-imposed exaction upon a developer, to (b) the cost of remedial
action by government to respond to the impact created by a proposed development. See
BAM. Dev.f LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2008 UT 74 f t 8-14, 196 P.3d 601 ["BAMIF}.
26

B.A.M. Dev. LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, fn. 2, 128 P.3d 1161 ["BAM

27

BAMII, 2008 UT 74 \ 2, 196 P.3d 601.

n
28

See BAM's Opening Brief, Point IV, "The Entirety of the Coerced Exaction is at
Issue," pp. 36-42.
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dedication exaction is now at issue.29 Further, this court (Wilkins, J.) clarified that
"...the exaction can be measured as the value of the land to be dedicated by the
developer at the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the
exaction."30
Where a development exaction requires dedication of land, as here, the "cost" of the
exaction is the dollar-value of the dedicated land and those additional costs required by the land
exaction31. Thus, the sole issue presented to Judge Toomey on remand was whether BAM's
exaction costs arising from the additional 13-foot dedication exceeded the costs of "the burden
that the community will bear because of the development."32

29

See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, Al?>
U.S. 172, 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 ("[A] claim that the application of government
regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity
charged with implementing the regulation has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue.") As Judge Hanson determined in
both prior trials in this case, BAM did not appeal the original 40-foot exaction to the
County's Planning Commission or Board of County Commissioners, but instead only
appealed the additional 13-feet exaction. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Remand, entered January 11, 2007, J. Hanson, p. 4,fflf7, 8 [R. 557]. See also
trial exhibit # 57, trial before J. Hanson, October 17, 2006 (BAM's Notice of Appeal to
Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, July 2, 1998, appealing denial of
development approval with a highway dedication remaining at the 40-foot right-of-way
line).
30

BAMII, 2008 UT 74 If 11, 196 P.3d 601.

31

/</.,f 11.

32

Id., f 10. [NOTE: In this iteration of the BAM saga, the County has chosen not to
provide another historical analysis of state and federal takings jurisprudence in the
"exactions" area, which includes the Nollan and Dolan decisions of the U. S. Supreme
Court, inasmuch as the parties and the appellate courts of Utah have already done so ably
and repeatedly throughout the long history of this litigation.]
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3
The Relevant Cost of the "Impact" is That Borne by the Government Generally
(Le.9 the Public), Not Just that Borne by Salt Lake County
BAM argues that the costs of responding to the traffic impact generated by BAM's
Subdivision which will be borne directly by the County are zero and, therefore, there can be no
"rough equivalency" between the County's costs and BAM's exaction costs.33 In this argument,
BAM relies solely upon a single word in Paragraph 13 of the BAM II decision, which states in

First, the trial court must determine whether the exaction and impact are related
in nature - or whether the solution (the exaction) directly addresses the specific
problem (the impact)34. Second, the trial court must determine what the cost of
dealing with the impacts would be to the County, absent the exaction; what the
cost of the exaction would be to the developer; and whether these two costs are
roughly equivalent. (Emphasis added).
BAM ignores the fact that in the amended BAMIIdecision issued October 24,2008, this
court made a single, but crucial change to its original BAMII decision issued July 15, 2008.
Upon a motion for rehearing filed by the County (and opposed by BAM), the Supreme Court
deleted Footnote 5 of its original decision, which read as follows:
It is unclear from the record whether the maintenance of 3500 South is the
responsibility of the County or of the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT). If widening the road is UDOT's responsibility, then the County
arguably would bear no cost resulting from the development's impacts, and
therefore any exaction relating to the traffic increase would exceed the Dolan
standard. If the impact does not affect the County, then it has no right to require

33

See BAM's Opening Brief, pp. 12-19.

34

During this trial, BAM stipulated that the impact (problem) and the exaction
(solution) are "related in nature." [R. 901,fii.2].
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the developer to contribute. (Emphasis added).
Moreover, paragraph 10 of BAM II states that
[w]e agree that the impact is the problem, or the burden that the community will
bear because of the development.(Emphasis added).
And in its conclusion (paragraph 14), BAM II reiterates that "[t]he Dolan analysis,
properly applied, asks whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is
roughly equal to the cost being extracted to offset it." (Emphasis added). BAM IPs deletion
of Footnote 5 from the original decision, and its references to the costs of a development's
impact to be borne by "the community," as opposed to "the County," leave the decision
ambiguous with respect to this issue. Thus, it now becomes the job of this court, in applying
BAMII's "rough equivalency" test, to determine as an issue of first impression whether - as
BAM argues - the trial court should only have considered those costs which have been, or will
be, borne directly by the County per se (as per Paragraph 13 of BAM II) or, conversely, the trial
court correctly considered those costs which will be borne generally by other governmental
entities on behalf of "the public" or "the community"to make infrastructure improvements
necessitated, in part, by BAM's development (as per Paragraphs 10 and 14).
BAM's "no County costs" argument requires a strained and hyper-technical reading of
BAMII, unsupported by any sound public policy rationale. At trial, the County's expert witness
Jon Nepstad, a transportation planning consultant who serves both public- and private-sector
clients, testified that major highway expansion projects are seldom undertaken alone by the
governmental entity which owns the subject road. Typically, such projects involve multiple
- P A G E 2 0 O F 39Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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governmental participants and multiple public funding sources. State, county, and municipal
roads are all part of a multi-faceted but integrated transportation system funded through the
same taxing mechanisms. Additionally, Nepstad testified that roads sometimes change
ownership either through annexation or legislative "jurisdictional transfers," and cannot be
logically segregated based solely upon which entity owns the road at any given point in time35.
It does not change the impact to the community whether a road happens to be owned or
maintained exclusively by the state, the county, or a municipality; the impact and cost analysis
is the same. Likewise, BAM's costs under the BAMII "rough equivalence" test are the same
whether the County or the State owns the road.
Hence, while the County has (so far) incurred no direct cost to improve the road, the
County also has received no direct "benefit" from the exaction. By BAM's reasoning, since
UDOT owns the road, it was UDOT that actually received the benefit of the exaction, not the
County. Therefore, if the County's costs incurred are zero, then the County's benefit derived
from the exaction must also be calculated as zero.
The most important reality in this case is that the benefit of the dedication does not inure
exclusively to one individual governmental entity or another, but rather to the "public" or the
"community" at large. While a road may be technically "owned" by a particular entity for
35

See Trial Transcript, Vol II., 116:3 - 122:22. Thus, BAM's repeated insistence
that "the County has no costs" to widen 3500 South is misleading. While the County may
have incurred no direct costs to date, if a future "jurisdictional transfer" devolved
ownership of the road to the County, then the County would be directly burdened by the
costs to widen the road when such a project takes place. In other words, the fact that the
County has not yet incurred direct costs to widen the road doesn't mean it never will.
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routine maintenance purposes (e.g., patching pot-holes, snow removal, etc.), it is the public as
a whole that uses, and benefits from, the road. For instance, public use of 3500 South is not
limited to taxpayers of the State of Utah, even though the road is owned by the State; use of
Salt Lake County-owned roads is similarly not restricted to residents of the County. Because
of the integrated nature of the public road network, the public as a whole benefits from major
road improvements; likewise, because of the integrated nature of road construction funding, the
public (or "community") as a whole generally pays for such improvements. Thus, the notion
that in a Dolan analysis, the governmental entity which imposes an exaction must be the same
entity that will incur the direct cost of responding to the impact is neither logical nor practical36.
There is no common law or statutory basis for B AM's conclusion that a zoning authority
must own the roadway in order for it to enforce regional master plan standards applicable to it.
Certainly, the Dolan decision itself makes no attempt to distinguish between the government
entity which imposes an exaction and that which will incur the cost of a development's impact.
Contrary to BAM's argument, the focus of Dolan and BAM II is upon the cost of a
36

Moreover, the County is required to regulate the land subdivision process even
though the affected road is a State-owned road because the State does not regulate
subdivision development. The County is the entity which regulates and approves
subdivision development simply because the State delegates the responsibility for local
land use regulation to the counties and municipalities as its political subdivisions. See
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 17-27a-501, et. seq.\ Sec. 10-9a-501. Thus, the State confers
exclusive authority to regulate and approve subdivision development on the counties
within unincorporated areas of a county (id., Sec. 17-27a-601, et. seq.), and the
municipalities within incorporated areas of a county (id., Sec. 10-9a-601, et. seq.). In this
case, the fact that the County imposed the road dedication exaction upon BAM with
respect to a road owned by the State is merely a function of a legislative scheme which
seeks localized land-use regulation.
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development's impact to the "community" or the "public," not to any single, discrete
governmental unit/ 7
Other substantial public policy considerations favor allowing local zoning authorities to
represent all affected public and private entities. Processing subdivision and other land use
applications through a single local authority that represents all regulators, utilities and other
interests (i.e., "one-stop shopping") saves the applicant and the public time and money and
avoids separate, inconsistent and/or redundant multi-agency review processes. A unified land
use authority, of the kind employed by the County in this case, also develops expertise in
applying technical substantive and procedural standards to land use applications. If BAM's
argument were law, no zoning authority would be willing to serve as a "clearing house" for the
variety of affected agencies out of concern for "takings" liability merely because it does not
own particular infrastructure connected to an exaction.
In short, BAM has offered no compelling legal or policy rationale supporting its
literalistic "cost to the County" interpretation of BAM II. The County urges this court to
interpret BAM II for the proposition that when comparing (a) the costs of an exaction to a
developer with (b) the costs of a development's impact, a court must consider the latter costs
as those borne by the public (i.e., "community") at large, rather than one isolated governmental
entity.

37

Except, of course, for Paragraph 13 of BAM II upon which BAM now relies
exclusively.
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4
RAM's "Double Taxation" Argument Under the Banberry Case is Misguided
During the third trial and now on appeal, BAM advanced a vague and confusing "double
taxation" argument relying upon an impact fee case, Banberry Development Corporation v.
South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).38 There are two key problems with BAM's
argument. First, Banberry is simply inapposite here because it deals solely with cash impact
fees (specifically, a water-connection fee and a park improvement fee), not in-kind exactions
such as a dedication of land for future roads. In fact, Banberry expressly limited application
of its seven "reasonableness factors" to "the fee in question," not to an exaction. Id.9 631 P.2d
at 904. Moreover, in 1995, Banberry was superceded by, and effectively codified almost wordfor-word as, the Utah Impact Fees Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101, et. seq.. See, Home
Builders Ass yn v. City of No. Logan, 983 P.2d 561, fn. 1 (Utah 1999).
Impact fees and in-kind exactions are very different, unique creatures, each with its own
statutory framework and legal analysis. Thus, while impact fees must be analyzed under the
Impact Fees Act and its case law progeny, in-kind development exactions are examined under
the County Land Use Development and Management Act ("CLUDMA"), Utah Code Ann. §1727a-507 which adopts the Dolan standard verbatim ("each exaction [shall be] roughly
proportionate, both in nature and extent, to the impact of the proposed development"), and the
case law governing exactions in Utah consists of Dolan and BAM II. BAM fails to offer any
legal authority supporting its effort to conflate impact fee analysis with exaction analysis.
**See BAM's Opening Brief, pp. 26-36.
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Second, the logic of BAM's "double taxation"argument is fundamentally flawed. BAM
seems to suggest that it should not have been required to "pay" for highway widening in the
form of the land dedication because its customers (i.e., those who purchase subdivision lots)
already have paid various taxes from which highway construction will eventually be financed.
Thus, BAM argues, it was effectively taxed twice for the same public improvement.39 By logical
extension, then, development exactions would never be constitutionally permissible because the
end users of any land development project are members of the public who presumably pay
taxes, resulting in "double taxation" in any exaction scenario. Thus, BAM's novel application
of Banberry would ultimately prohibit all development exactions, a result that effectively
requires this court to discard the exaction provisions of CLUDMA, and flies in the face of
Dolan and BAMII, both of which plainly allow exactions to be imposed, provided they comport
with the "rough proportionality" ("equivalence") standard. BAM has offered no rational
argument or authority supporting a legal conclusion that Banberry in any way aids its position
in this case.
5
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded, Based on the Evidence, That the Cost of the
Exaction to BAM Was Far Less than the Cost of BAM's Subdivision Development to
the Community
(A) Cost of the Response by the Community to BAM's Traffic Impact. At trial, Mr.
Nepstad outlined his calculations of the itemized costs to be borne by the community in

39

Id., p. 27: "Banberry ... articulat[ed] the principle [that] residents should not be
required to 'pay twice.'"
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responding to the traffic impact likely to be generated by BAM's subdivision development and
the source data upon which he relied.40 This testimony was not rebutted by BAM.41 According
to Nepstad, the community response will take the form of a project to widen 3500 South to a
106-foot wide road which is presently projected by the Wasatch Front Regional Council
["WFRC"] to occur between 2016 and 2025. The estimated cost of the project (reduced to 1998
dollar values to provide an accurate comparison to BAM's 1998 exaction costs) is $6,748,700.
BAM does not dispute this estimate. Nepstad testified that the portion of this cost directly
attributable to the traffic impact created by BAM's development is 5%, or $337,500.
Mr. Nepstad arrived at his 5% attribution to BAM by comparing (a) the total increase
in traffic which was expected, based upon official projections of the WFRC, to occur on the
relevant traffic "link" {i.e., the segment of 3500 South between 7200 West and 8000 West) by
the year 2020, or a total of 9,625 new vehicle trips per day ("trips"), with (b) the portion of that
number which is likely to be caused by BAM's Subdivision, which is 488 trips {i.e., 488 / 9,625

40

See Technical Report of Fehr & Peers Transportation Consultants, by Jon
Nepstad, received in evidence as Exhibit D-62, trial before J. Toomey, May 26-27, 2010
at p. 7, Table 2.
41

While counsel for BAM bickered with Mr. Nepstad on cross-examination about
Nepstad's cost estimate to acquire necessary right-of-way properties for the anticipated
road project {see id., p. 7, Table 2, left column, "Estimated Government Costs," "Right of
Way"), and continues this quarrel on appeal, BAM failed to offer any technical evidence
rebutting either Nepstad's source data or his calculations. In fact, BAM failed to offer
qualified rebuttal expert testimony in response to either of the County's expert witnesses.
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= 5%)42. The 9,625 new trips expected by 2020 is in addition to the 13,385 trips determined by
UDOT in 1997 through traffic metering. Thus, the total traffic expected in 2020 is 23,000.
For purposes of assessing traffic "impact," the relevant figures are the 9,625 new trips
expected by 2020, and the 5% of that amount attributable to BAM. At trial, however, BAM's
"expert witness," attorney Craig Smith, testified that in his opinion, Nepstad's computation is
faulty because it does not recognize the prior trial testimony of the Salt Lake County
Transportation Engineer, Andrea Pullos, who testified in the first trial (April 23, 2001) that a
106-foot wide road can provide up to seven lanes of traffic with a resulting "theoretical" vehicle
carrying capacity of 37,000 vehicles per day.43 Mr. Smith, who is not a transportation engineer
or planner, opined that the 37,000 figure should be used in computing BAM's share of the local
traffic "impact," rather than the 9,625 new trips used by Mr. Nepstad, which would yield a
much smaller percentage "share" of the local impact on the traffic link attributable to BAM44.
In this argument, BAM's logic is fundamentally flawed, and BAM has offered no legal
authority for its position. The issue is not what percentage of local traffic volume BAM's
42

See Technical Report of Fehr & Peers Transportation Consultants, supra, p. 6,
Figure 2.
43

BAM takes this statement by Ms. Pullos out of context. See Transcript of Trial,
April 23-24, 2001, p. 155,1. 4 through p. 157,1. 24 (testimony of Andrea Pullos). In
cross-examination, BAM's counsel asked Ms. Pullos what are the "theoretical" maximum
vehicle carrying capacities of roads of various widths. Id., p. 155,1. 4-23. Ms. Pullos
stated that a 106-foot wide (53-foot half-width) road can have as many as seven lanes,
depending upon its lane configuration ("cross-section"), with a maximum carrying
capacity of 31,000 to 37,000 vehicles per day.
44

488/37,000= .01%.
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subdivision will contribute to the "theoretical" maximum carrying capacity of a possible 7-lane
road. For two reasons, BAM's preferred foirmula is irrelevant to determining the extent of
BAM's "impact" on the traffic link.
First, as Mr. Nepstad testified, the current WFRC plan provides for two travel lanes in
each direction, plus curb parking and/or a center transit lane {i.e., for express buses, light-rail,
etc.). The 106-foot road width may or may not ever be filled to its maximum "theoretical"
capacity with auto traffic. Rather, it will be "filled" with transportation purpose, which doesn't
necessarily mean just automobile traffic. The use of a turning lane and/or transit lane may
consume a significant portion of the 106-foot width and would reduce available traffic lanes,
while maintaining the essential transportation purposes of the corridor.
Second, in assessing BAM's "impact," the issue logically must be this: What will be
BAM's percentage share of the actual amount of new {i.e., increased) traffic expected to be
generated on the traffic link by 2020? The "theoretical" maximum vehicle carrying capacity
of a 106-foot road is irrelevant; what matters is how much of the actual future increased use of
the traffic link, as a percentage of the total increased use, will be generated by BAM, as
opposed to other local growth45. Accordingly, Mr. Nepstad testified that he determined that
total actual traffic increase expected on the traffic link by 2020 will be 9,625 trips per day; of
45

Stated otherwise, the only sensible way to determine what portion of a
community's cost to assuage the impact of new development generally on public
infrastructure (such as a road) is attributable to any one development project specifically,
is to determine the amount of incremental impact generated by the specific development
(here, BAM's impact on traffic volume) as a percentage of the total impact on the same
infrastructure reasonably expected to be generated by all new development in the locality.
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that actual increased traffic, BAM will contribute 488 new vehicle trips per day, or 5%;
therefore, BAM is responsible for 5% of the community's "cost" to assuage traffic impact
generally on that traffic link. The focus upon increase in traffic volume is crucial because the
entire Dolan concept of "impact" refers to the amount of increase in public demand that will
be placed on specific public infrastructure as a result of a proposed development46.
Thus, while BAM's preference for the 37,000 carrying capacity "denominator" is
understandably self-serving, it illogically conflates the discrete concepts of "traffic impart" and
"traffic capacity" Mr. Nepstad correctly concluded that B AM's share of the expected increase
in public use of the traffic link (i.e, the "impact" of BAM's development) is 5%, or
$337,500.00. The trial court acted within its discretion in accepting this unrebutted evidence.
(B) Cost of the Road Dedication Exaction to BAM. At trial, the County's real estate
development expert, Taylor Dudley, evaluated each element of BAM's summary of
"Improvement Costs for County Takings." (See Ex. D-63). First, he testified that BAM actually
lost no marketable building lots at all, despite BAM's contention that it lost two lots of a
possible 46-lot subdivision. BAM's claim doesn't square with the facts. As established by the
testimony of Scott McCleary, BAM's owner/president, BAM's original subdivision application,

46

See Dolan, supra, 512 US at 393, 114 S.Ct. at 2320 (analyzing the "impact"
expected to result from petitioner's proposed store and paved parking lot development,
the court noted that "increasing the amount of impervious surface will increase the
quantity and rate of storm water flow from petitioner's property" into an adjacent storm
drainage channel called Fanno Creek (emphases added)). The "impact" of a development
is measured by the increase in pressure (i.e., public use) it places on public infrastructure.
See also, Martinez, John, Government Takings, §§2:18 - 2:20, 2008 Thompson/West.
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reviewed August 26,1997 by the County's planning commission, only called for 45 lots, with
lots abutting 3500 South having direct driveway access to the state highway. See trial Ex. 6.
Within two weeks, BAM amended its application, reducing the lot configuration from 45 to 44
lots in order to eliminate the direct driveway-highway access as per UDOT requirements. It was
not until four months later, January 1998, that BAM was informed that the road dedication
requirement, originally set at 40-feet, had been increased to 53-feet. Clearly, therefore, the
reduction in BAM's lot yield from 45 to 44 had nothing to do with the increased exaction.
Hence, Mr. Dudley testified that BAM realized no net loss in lot yield as a result of the
13-foot exaction, and that the available square footage about which Mr. McCleary testified
would be "undevelopable." However, Dudley did acknowledge that the 13-foot exaction
reduced the depths of BAM's nine lots abutting 3500 South by 13-feet each. He testified that
the resulting reduction in lot size reduced the potential market value of each of those nine lots
by $1.15 per square foot47. Computing the value of this lost ground to BAM is fairly simple.
BAM stipulated that the "frontages" of the nine highway-abutting lots, based upon dimensions
reflected BAM's final subdivision plat, were as follows: Lot 1 = 56.2f; Lot 2 = 30'; Lot 3 = 81';
Lot 4 = 81'; Lot 5 = 81'; Lot 6 = 81'; Lot 7 = 81'; Lot 8 = 87.2'; Lot 9 = 67.74'. The total
frontage of these nine lots, where they abut 3500 South, is 696.14'. Hence, the total square
footage lost by BAM as a result of the 13-foot exaction is 9,049.82 (i.e., 696.14' x 13' =
9,049.82), resulting in a monetary cost of $10,407.29 (i.e., 9049.82 sq. ft. x $1.15/ =
47

This value is based on BAM's own summary of "Improvement Costs" (Ex. D63) which places the "raw ground value" at $1.15 sq. ft.
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$10,407.29). As the trial court found, this amount represents an actual "loss"or "developer
cost" which BAM can validly claim in this analysis.48
Next, Mr. Dudley testified that BAM's itemized "costs" (see Trial Ex. D-63) for items
actually attributable to the 13-foot exaction were as follows: (a) $10,140 for additional
pavement required as a result of the exaction; (b) $23,250 for relocation of six power poles
which were within the area of the 13-foot exaction; (c) $12,450 for "re-engineering" cost49
required to reconfigure the subdivision as a result of the 13-foot increased exaction; (d)
additional excavation required by the 13-foot exaction; and (e) removal of trees, shrubs, etc.,
required by the 13-foot exaction. All other costs enumerated at trial by BAM were not directly
occasioned by the 13-foot exaction, a fact to which even Mr. McCleary agreed. Thus, BAM's

48

Mr. Dudley testified that many of the costs not related to the 13-foot exaction
which BAM is now attempting to recover from the County are for items which provided
not only a benefit to the general public, but also a direct benefit to BAM itself. For
example, he testified, the required curb, gutter, sidewalk, privacy fencing, and similar
amenities increased the aesthetic and functional value of the subdivision (e.g., with
enhanced safety, security, privacy, etc.), thereby making the lots more marketable at a
higher price than without such amenities. At trial, even Mr. McCleary, BAM's principal,
acknowledged that eliminating direct driveway access to a busy highway and is a safety
measure designed to prevent hazards such as "kids' soccer balls rolling into the street."
Thus, even if such costs were related to the 13-foot exaction, they would not be fully
chargeable against the County because BAM received part of the benefit of these
improvements.
49

Mr. Dudley also testified that the "reasonable" costs of the re-engineering fees,
at the relevant time, was about $8,000. BAM's Scott McCleary countered Dudley's
testimony, saying that the full $12,450 in extra engineering fees was actually, reasonably
and necessarily paid. At trial, the County conceded this point to BAM as reflected above.
-PAGE31OF 39Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

actual, proven costs, as found by the trial court50, for "the value of the land to be dedicated by
the developer at the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the [additional
13-foot] exaction" were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

LOST LAND (decreased lot sizes for the 9 "frontage" lots):
$ 10,407.29
ADDITIONAL PAVEMENT required by the 13-foot exaction: $ 10,140.00
RELOCATED POWER POLES required by the 13-foot exaction: $23,250.00
RE-ENGINEERING FEES required by the 13-foot exaction:
$ 12,450.00
EXCAVATION, addition required by the 13-foot exaction
$5,400.00

6.

TREE REMOVAL required by the 13-foot exaction

$11,175.00

TOTAL Developer Costs:

$83,997.29

(C) The Trial Court Correctly Applied the BAM II "Rough Equivalency" Standard
The Dolan analysis, as refined by BAM II, simply compares (a) the monetary cost of the
government-imposed exaction to the developer ["Exaction Cost"] against (b) the monetary cost
to government in responding to the increased impact on public infrastructure likely to be created
by the proposed development ["Impact Cost"]. If the Exaction Cost and the Impact Cost are
approximately equal ("roughly equivalent"), then no "taking" has occurred.51 It logically
follows that if the developer's Exaction Cost is less than an amount which could reasonably be
considered "roughly equivalent" to the government's Impact Cost, then there has also been no
"taking."
As the trial court found, such is the case here. Because BAM's Exaction Cost of
$83,997.29 is "significantly" less that the Impact Cost to government of $337,500.00, BAM has
50

R. 905,119.

51

BAMII, supra, 2008 UT 741 11, 12.
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suffered no constitutionally compensable taking.52 The trial court so found based on the
evidence.
6
The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Limit or Exclude the Trial Testimony
of RAM's "Rebuttal Expert Witness" Craig Smith
It is axiomatic that the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is committed to the
discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed unless it constitutes an abuse
of discretion. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35,1f 66,44 P.3d 794. Reversal of a trial court's ruling
on the admissibility of expert testimony requires "a clear showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bangart,
525 P. 2d 602, 608-608 (Utah 1974). BAM claims here that the trial court "refused to receive
proffered testimony of plaintiffs 'rebuttal' expert witness,"53 and that such refusal was
prejudicial error. However, BAM fails to point to any specific instance in which the court
refused to receive properly offered evidence from Mr. Smith.54
Some procedural background is appropriate here. Before the third trial, BAM designated
Craig Smith, a local attorney with widely recognized expertise in land use law, as a "rebuttal
expert witness" to rebut the anticipated trial testimony of the County's transportation planning
expert, Mr. Nepstad.55 The County filed a pretrial motion in limine56 seeking to prevent Mr.
52

Order, p. 8 [R. 906].

53

BAM's Opening Brief, p. 42.

54

The complete trial testimony of Mr. Smith is attached as Appendix 5.

55

See Plaintiffs Designation of Rebuttal Expert Witness, July 17, 2009 [R. 638].
That BAM would even present an expert to rebut Mr. Nepstad at all is curious inasmuch
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Smith from testifying, essentially because (a) Mr. Smith has no qualifications as a transportation
planning or engineering expert, and (b) Mr. Smith, as an attorney designated as a witness,
cannot be permitted to argue legal points or conclusions to the court in his testimony.
The trial court denied the County's motion in limine on May 24, 201057, allowing Mr.
Smith to testify. Mr. Smith's trial testimony began Thursday afternoon, May 27, 2010, and
concluded Friday morning, May 28.58 Throughout Mr. Smith's testimony, the County asserted
numerous (and often repetitive) objections based on relevance, lack of foundation, that the
questions were vague, called for narrative answers, or called for legal arguments and
conclusions. The trial court sustained certain objections, overruling others. However, BAM
now fails to identify any specific testimony that the trial court allegedly excluded improperly.
In actuality, the trial court afforded BAM enormous latitude to frame a proper question,
and, contrary to BAM's assertion, never refused Mr. Smith's testimony wholesale. For
instance, during the second day of Mr. Smith's testimony, the court admonished BAM's
attorney in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: Look, you seem to be inviting this witness and he's an
accomplished man with a lot to say but you seem to be inviting him to make a
speech. I need you to ask him a question that he can just respond to and not just

as BAM chose never to depose Mr. Nepstad.
56

R. 708-752.

57

R. 803.

58

See Trial Transcript, Vols. II and II (internal pagination Vol. II, pp. 197 - 224;
Vol III, pp. 1 - 27); attached as Appendix 5.
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a share your thoughts.
MR. HOMER: Not an open ended - okay.
THE COURT: It needs to be a question.
MR. HOMER [to the witness]: Under the concepts that are embodied under
Paragraph 1 of your report on page 3, Mr. Smith, tell us then what your comments
would be in rebuttal to Mr. Nepstad's THE COURT: Mr. Homer, you're doing the same thing59.
After extensive additional questioning of the witness, Mr. Smith's testimony was
concluded by BAM's counsel:
MR. HOMER: Okay. Talk strictly to Mr. Nepstad's selection of that 2020 date
as being the major one that cuts off (inaudible).
WITNESS: Yeah, he picked a date of 23 years. I don't Think there's anything
scientific about that. The things I've readMR. HANSEN (County's attorney): Your Honor, excuse me sir, objection,
foundation. This witness does not have the ability to speculate on the scientific
accuracy of Mr. Nepstad's selection of research material and data.
THE COURT: Sustained. If he would have picked another one, I'll allow him
to testify to that and why.
THE WITNESS: WellMR. HOMER: Hold on, hold on.
THE WITNESS: Can I answer that question?
MR. HOMER: Hold on, hold on. Did you understand the judge's remark?
THE WITNESS: I did.
MR. HOMER: If that were formulated as question from me, could you answer that
question, yes or no?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I would have picked another day.
MR. HOMER: Okay. Would you then answer that question?
THE WITNESS: Well, yeah, what I would have picked is the 37,000 is the number I
picked.
MR. HOMER: And not even tie it to a date but tie it to a quantity?
THE WITNESS: That's the solution, yes.
MR. HOMER: I think that's all I have.

Id., Vol. Ill, internal pagination, 15:9 - 20 (App. 5).
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MR. HANSEN: No questions.60
Mr. Smith's testimony was then concluded, having been terminated by BAM5 s attorney,
and not because of any ruling or action by the trial court. BAM fails to identify any specific
question that Mr. Smith was not allowed to answer, and fails to cite legal authority challenging
any particular evidentiary ruling by the trial court. Since BAM chose to designate Mr. Smith
only as a rebuttal expert, the trial court properly limited the scope of Mr. Smith's testimony to
rebuttal of the County's experts.
Moreover, BAM failed to cite the record to establish that it preserved ils challenge for
appeal. As this court recently reiterated,
[i]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.
This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for
correction of the proceeding. For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to
correct the error (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion [,] (2) the issue
must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.
Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, f 14,

P. 3d

, quoting Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc.,

2004 UT 72, f 51, 99 P 3d 801. See also, U T A H R . APP. P., 24(a)(5)(A). BAM's argument on
appeal falls woefully short of these requirements. In fact, BAM makes no effort to identify
anywhere in the trial record where it timely challenged any particular ruling of the trial court
regarding Mr. Smith, or where BAM offered any supporting evidence or legal authority.
BAM's repetitious argument that under Dolan, the governmental entity which imposed an

6

7d., 26:1 -27:4.
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exaction has the burden of proving the exaction's constitutionality, is entirely irrelevant. This
argument simply attempts to divert attention from the fact BAM is solely responsible for its
own decisions (a) not to depose the County's experts, (b) to designate its own expert witness
only for "rebuttal," and (c) to select as its "expert" an attorney - rather than a transportation
planner, engineer or real estate development finance expert - who lacked the qualifications
needed to rebut the County's experts.
In short, BAM provides no specific basis in the record to enable this court to even
review, much less reverse, the trial judge's management of Mr. Smith's testimony, which was
well within her discretion.
CONCLUSION
The County respectfully submits that it was not "clearly erroneous" for the trial court to
find that: (1) because BAM failed to appeal any exaction to the County land-use authority
except the additional 13-foot exaction, the scope of the issue trial on remand was - as made
clear by BAM I and BAM II - limited to that additional exaction; (2) where a development
exaction requires dedication of land, as here, the "cost" of the exaction is "the value of the
dedicated land and other costs required by the exaction," and the trial court correctly determined
that amount to be $83,997.29 based on the evidence; (3) the relevant cost of the "impact" or a
proposed development is that which is borne by government generally (i.e., the public), and not
just costs borne directly by Salt Lake County as the entity which imposed the exaction; (4)
based on the evidence, that BAM is responsible for 5% of the community's "cost" to assuage
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traffic impact generally on the relevant 3500 South traffic link; (5) the impact cost of the project
(reduced to 1998 dollar values to provide an accurate comparison to BAM's 1998 exaction
costs) which is directly attributable to the impact created by BAM's development is
$337,500.00; (6) BAM's exaction cost, caused by the exaction of the 13-foot road dedication,
was $83,997.29; and therefore (7) because BAM's Exaction Cost is substantially less that the
Impact Cost to government, BAM has suffered no taking or private property.
The trial judge properly exercised her discretion as finder of fact in determining, based
on the evidence presented, that BAM's exaction costs were less that the public's impact costs,
and under Dolan and BAM III, the trial court correctly held for the County.
DATED this 17th day of May, 2011.
SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
By:

QONAmHTHANSEN
THOMAS L. CHRISTENSEN
Deputy District Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

B A M . DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

CASE NO. 980908157

Defendant

DATE: JULY 8,2010

This action came before the Court for a bench trial on May 26,27, and 28,2010
pursuant to an order of remand from the Utah Supreme Court. The Issue on remand is
"whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is roughly equal
to the cost being extracted to offset it," B A M , Bevel., LLC, v. Salt Lake County, 2008
UT74, H14 FB.AM //"). The Plaintiff, B A M , Development, LLC ("BAM."), was
represented by counsel Stephen Homer; the Defendant, Salt Lake County ("the
County"), was represented by Donald Hansen, Thomas Christensen, and Melanie
Mitchell.
Background
B A M . sought the County's approval to build a residential development. The

1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

County conditioned its approval on B A M . expanding the existing width of 3500 South,
a major road bordering the proposed development. Later, the County informed B A M .
that It would be required to increase the street width even more. This additional
exaction, which is a 13-foot wide strip running the length of one side ofthe property as it
adjoins 3500 South, was the subject of B AM.'s appeal in which it contended that the
exaction was an unconstitutional talcing, and the decision of this appeal-BAM. //--was
the remand that prompted the most recent trial in this case. The history of the case and
the Utah Supreme Courts explanations and directives bear recounting.
The Court action began when B A M . sued the County, asking either to avoid the
exaction or to receive just compensation for the alleged taking. The Plaintiffs
Complaint alleged causes of action for Unreasonable and Excessive Development
Exactions; Uncompensated Taking of Private Properly for Public Use; Violation of Due
Process; Denial of Equal Protection Under the Law; Denial of Uniform Operation of
Laws; Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and Non-Compliance with Statutory
Requirements. Judgement for Defendant was entered July 30,2001, with the Court
finding no cause of action on any claim.
After losing at trial, B A M . appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, and then to
the Utah Supreme Court, ultimately securing a remand and a directive to this Court to
use the "rough proportionality" analysis set forth in Dolan v. CHyofTigartf, 512 U.S. 374
(1994) to determine whether the exaction was an unconstitutional taking. Accordingly,
this Court conducted another trial,1 at the conclusion of which it determined that all of

'The first two trials in this matter were conducted by Judge Timothy Hansen.
2
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the Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice. This gave rise to another
appeal, and as noted above, the BAM

//appellate decision produced the remand that

brought the matter to trial in May 2010.
In BAM. If, the Supreme Court considered whether, in the second trial, this
Court correctly applied the rough proportionality analysis established by the Dolan case,
and determined that it had not. The rough proportionality analysis is important because
if the required exaction is not roughly proportionate to the-jmpact of the development,
the exaction is an unconstitutional taking. In prior proceedings, the parties agreed that
the impact of the development is a 3,04% increase in traffic on 3500 South, but this is
an apples to oranges comparison against the 13-foot exaction.
The S A M // decision offered some instruction for determining whether the
exaction and the development's impact are roughly proportionate, explaining that
"rough proportionality" Is not what the United Steles Supreme Court actually meant, but
"rough equivalence' This entails determining whether the required exaction is "related
both in nature and axferrfto the impact of the proposed development." BAM 11, % 9.
Accordingly, the court must first determine whether the nature of the exaction and its
impact-the burden the community will bear because of the development-are related.2
Second, the Court must determine whether the exaction and impact are related in
extent. The Supreme Court noted that this
implies that both the exaction and the impact should be measured In the same
manner, br using the same standard. The most appropriate measure Is
cost-specifically, the cost of the exaction and the impact to the developer and

*The parties have stipulated that the nature component of the equation has been
met.
3
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the municipality, respectively. The Impact of the development can be measured
as the cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact Likewise, the exaction
can be measured as the value of the iand to be dedicated by the developer at
the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the exaction
Jd H11. Finally, tt[t]he trial court must determine whether the costs to each party are
roughly equivalent/ to U12. The Supreme Court forecast that this would be simple,
and if the sums are about the same, then they are roughly equivalent Precision is not
required.
This Court's assignment, then, was to "determine what the cost of dealing with
the impact would be to the County, absent any exaction; what the cost of the exaction
would be to the developer; and whether the two costs are roughly equivalent." Id 1f 13.
In other words, "[tjhe Dolan analysis, property applied, asks whether the imposition on
the community of a proposed development is roughly equal to the cost being extraded
to offset it" /d 1f 14, The remand did not include a directive to consider B A M / s
claims for equal protection, uniform operation of law, or equitable estoppel.
As Indicated, the trial spanned three days; counsel subsequently submitted
closing arguments in writing. The Court has read and considered these, and has
reviewed the evidence from both previous trials, as well as the rest of the file, and the
appellate court decisions and other authority cited by counsel. Pursuant to the Utah
Supreme Court's directive in BAM

//, the Court has evaluated B A M . ' s claim using the

rough equivalent standard, and makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 30,1997, B A M . submitted to the County an application and proposed
4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plat for the development of a proposed subdivision known as Westridge
Meadows ("the Subdivision"), and located at approximately 7700 West and 3500
South in unincorporated Salt Lake County.
At the times relevant to this action, 3500 South was owned by the State of Utah
and managed by the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). The
ownership of public roads occasionally changes, however, as the result of a
legislative "Jurisdictional transfer or by operation of law through annexation and
incorporation of municipalities,
The proposed plat for the Subdivision included a 40-foot highway dedication
.along 3500 South, which is on the north boundary of BAM.'s property.
Salt Lake County's engineering and development staff approved BAM.'s
proposed subdivision on August 26,1997, subject to compliance with County
road standards, including a 40-foot highway right-of-way dedication of land
where the subdivision parcel abuts 3500 South.
On June 23,1998, the County planning commission preliminarily approved
BAM.'s amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication along 3500
South.
On July 2,1998, B A M . appealed the 53-foot right-of-way requirement to the
Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners.
The Board of County Commissioners denied BAM.'s appeal on July 15,1998.
On June 23,1999, the Couniy planning commission approved BAM.'s
amended subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53foot dedication.
S
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9.

The Board of County Commissioners granted final approval of the plat on August
18,1999, and the plat was recorded In the Recorder's Office on August 27,
1999.

10.

BAM. constructed the subdivision,

11.

In April 1998, County transportation engineer Andrea Pullos analyzed historical
and projected traffic volumes on 2500 South in the "traffic link11 between the
intersecting cross streets 7200 West and 8Q00 West, an area in which the
Subdivision lies,

12.

Ms, Pullos's analysis used historical traffic daia compiled by UDOT that showed
increasing traffic volume on 3500 South between the traffic link. She compared
the anticipated traffic volume increase that would be created by the Subdivision
with the amount of BAM.'s land that the exaction would require BAM. to
dedicate for future highway right-of-way.

13.

Ms. Pullos concluded that the two were roughly proportionate.

14.

In the period during which the Subdivision application was pending, local growth
and development in this afea was expected to continue, generating increased
traffic volume on 3500 South,

15.

WFCR anticipates responding to this increased growth by widening existing
roads, and also widening the traffic link. The cost of the project in 1998 dollar
values Is $6,748,700.

16.

The road-widening project will likelyfoefinancedby a combination of
government road construction funding sources, including federal highway funds
and additional State, County, and/or municipal funds.
6
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17.

Comparing thetotalexpected increase in traffic by the year 2020 with the portion
of the vehicle trips attributable to the Subdivision, the portion of the $6,748,700
total cost that is directly attributabletothe Subdivision is 5%, or $337,500.00.

18.

This sum reflects the cost to the public of responding to the increased traffic
likely to be caused by the Subdivision.

19.

B AM.'s costs resulting from the 13-foot exaction are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

land lost from the decrease in lot sizes for 9 lots:
additional pavement costs
power pole relocation costs
fees for re-engineering
excavation costs
tree removal costs
Total:

20.

$10,407.29
$10,140.00
$23,250.00
$12,450.00
$ 5,400.00
$11.175.00
$83,997.29

Although BAM. has attempted to challenge the entire highway right-of-way
dedication and to include in the exaction the incidental development costs of
Installing curb and gutter, fencing, storm and sewer lines, the only issue rt
appealed to the County Board of Commissioners was the requirement of a 53foot dedication rather than a 40-foot dedication. Accordingly, the only issue
before this Court was the additional 13-feet exacted by the County.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The scope of this remand was to determine whether the additional 13-foot

exaction of land required by the County was an unconstitutional taking of private
property without just compensation. The impact cost and the exaction cost were related
in nature. The Court has employed a rough equivalency analysis, comparing the
monetary cost of therelevantgovernment-imposed exaction to BAM,-$83,997.29.-with
the government's monetary cost-$337,500.00~and determined that because the cost to
7
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the.community is significantly higher than the cost to BAM. of the exaction, there has
Iteen no taking.
In reaching these conclusions, the Court has taken into account B AML's
argument that paragraph 13 of the BAM //decision confined this Court to considering
only the cost to the County, The County points to paragraphs 10 and 14, and the Utah
Supreme Courts elimination of footnote 5 in the decision that preceded BAM h in
support of its contention that whatlhe Court should examine is the cost to the
community. Based upon the arguments set forth in the County's Closing Argumentthe
Court concludes that this approach is more persuasive,
ORDER
The County is to submit a proposed form of judgment at, an appropriate time
pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Third Judicial District

JUL 2 9 2010

.,J£

SALT LAK£ COUNTY

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE and TAXATION OF
COSTS

Plaintiff,

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

Civil No. 980908157 CD
Judge KATE A. TOOMEY
[On remand from Utah Supreme Court,
No. 20070137-SC]

Defendant.

The above-captioned civil action came on regularly for a bench trial on May 26, 27 and 28,
2010 on an order of remand by the Utah Supreme Court (see decision and remand order, Utah
Supreme Court No. 20070137-SC, at 2008 UT 74, f 14, 196 P.3d 601). Based upon the court's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed herein on July 12,2010, which are attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference, and which arise from the court's
review of the evidence received in the above bench trial, together with the evidence received in the
two previous trials in this action, and the arguments and authorities submitted by the parties' counsel,
PAGE 1 OF 3
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the court hereby enters JUDGMENT against plaintiff B.A. M. Development, LLC, finding no cause
of action, and in favor of defendant Salt Lake County, and therefore the complaint in this action shall
be and is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Pursuant to

UTAH RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 54(d)(2) and Rule 54(e), and the

DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS and MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
COSTS filed herein, and for good cause shown, costs are hereby taxed against plaintiff B.A.M.
Development, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, in favor of defendant Salt Lake County, as a
judgment in the amount of$
Dated this

ffiOH'3^
%°\

day of

•

JULJLC^

, 2010.

Approved as to form:

Stephen G. Homer
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HB.A.M Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County
Utah,2008.
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL
Supreme Court of Utah.
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C, a Utah limited
liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic and political
subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and
Appellee.
No. 20070137.
July 15,2008.
Background: Developer appealed denial of license
due to its objection to dedicating additional land for
expanded roadway. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., found in
favor of county. Developer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 87 P.3d 710. reversed and remanded with
directions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The
Supreme Court. Nehring. J., 128 P.3d 1161, held that
the "rough proportionality'1 test governed county's
exaction of portion of developer's property. The
District Court, Third District, Salt Lake Department,
Timothy R. Hanson. J., denied developer's claim.
Developer appealed.
Holding: The Supreme Court. Wilkins. J., held that
court's "rough proportionality" analysis should have
been a "rough equivalency" test that compared
respective costs of municipally required exaction and
its impact to developer and county.

General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases
Whether the proper analysis was applied by a trial
court is a mixed question of law and fact.
121 Appeal and Error 30 €^>863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General Most Cited Cases
When the legal concept of a case is easily defined
and the case involves important constitutional
property concerns, the standard of review is
correctness.
131 Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7)
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking: Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.1Q(7) k. Exactions and
Conditions. Most Cited Cases
''Rough
proportionality"
test
to
determine
constitutionality of a municipally required exaction
requires a ^rough equivalence" comparison of
respective costs and impact of exaction on parties.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
14] Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7)

Reversed and remanded.
Hi Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 4 2 ( 9 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKA) Scope. Standards, and Extent, in

148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use:
Building Codes
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148k2.1Q(7) k. Exactions and
Conditions. Most Cited Cases
A court engaging in analysis of the constitutionality
of a municipally required exaction must determine
(1) whether the nature of the exaction and impact are
related, (2) whether the exaction and impact are
related in extent, either by measuring cost to the
municipality of assuaging the impact, or by
measuring the value of the land to be dedicated by
the developer at the time of the exaction, and. (3)
whether the costs to each party are roughly
equivalent. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
151 Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7)
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and
Conditions. Most Cited Cases
If the costs to each party are about the same, they are
"roughly equivalent" for the purpose of analyzing the
constitutionality of a municipally required exaction.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
161 Eminent Domain 148 €==>2.10(7)
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*1 1 1 Appellant B.A.M. Development alleges that
the trial court incorrectly applied the "rough
proportionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of
Tizard 512 U.S. 374. 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d
304 (1994), in examining whether an exaction
required of the developer by Appellee Salt Lake
County was an unconstitutional taking. We hold that
the trial court did not apply the correct analysis, and
thus reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
f 2 In 1997, B.A.M. Development (B.A.M.) sought
approval from Salt Lake County to build a residential
development. The County informed B.A.M. that
approval was conditioned upon B.A.M. expanding
the current width of the major road bordering the
proposed development (3500 South) from seventeen
feet "half-width" (approximately 34 feet in total
width) to 40 feet half-width. Later, in accordance
with changes to the County's master traffic plan, the
County told B.A.M. that it would be required to
increase the street to fifty-three feet half-width. This
additional exaction of thirteen feet, B.A.M. alleges,
represents an unconstitutional taking.
U 3 After appealing the County's decision through
administrative channels, B.A.M. sued the County,
seeking either to escape the exaction or to receive just
compensation for the alleged taking. After losing in
the trial court, B.A.M. appealed to the court of
appeals and then to this court.

148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
I48R2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and
Conditions. Most Cited Cases
To determine constitutionality of a municipally
required exaction, trial court should have carried out
a "rough equivalency" analysis by comparing
respective costs of municipally required exaction and
its impact to developer and county. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

f 4 In a prior decision on this same case, this court
held that the trial court should use the "rough
proportionality" analysis in Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304
(1994), to determine whether the exaction was an
unconstitutional taking. B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt
Lake County, 2006 UT 2, f 46, 128 P.3d 1161. On
remand, the trial court again denied B.A.M.'s claims.
B.A.M. now appeals from that decision.

Third District, Salt Lake; The Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, No. 980908157.
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for plaintiff.
Lohra L. Miller. Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake City,
for defendant.
WILKINS. Justice:

£U[211! 5 The dispute between the parties is whether
the trial court correctly applied the "rough
proportionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of
Tizard. 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d
304 (1994). Whether the proper analysis was applied
is a mixed question of law and fact. In this case.

ANALYSIS

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 3

— P.3d -—
._. P3d —% 2008 WL 2726956 (Utah), 2008 UT 45
2008 WL 2726956 (Utah)

because "the legal concept is easily defined" and
because the case involves important constitutional
property concerns, the standard of review is
correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, OT 23-24.
144 P.3d 1096 ("Discretion is most confined-and the
standard of review is nondeferential-when the legal
concept is easily defined by appellate courts or when
appellate courts erect strict fences for policy
reasons.").
•J 6 In Dolan, the United States Supreme Court held
that a municipally required exaction must be roughly
proportionate to the impact of the development;
otherwise, the exaction is an unconstitutional taking
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Dolan, 512
U.S. at 391 ("We think a term such as 'rough
proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment."). The
Dolan analysis requires a court to examine two
factors, the exaction and the development's impact,
and to determine whether the two are in rough
proportionality. In this case, both parties effectively
agree that one of those factors-the impact of the
development-is a 3.04% increase in traffic along
3500 South. The parties disagree on the other factor,
however, as well as whether the two are roughly
proportionate.—
*2 % 7 A closer examination of Dolan clarifies how
to determine whether the two factors are roughly
proportionate. In Dolan, the Court looked first to how
the states had approached the issue of exactions as
unconstitutional takings. See id. at 389-91.After
examining various approaches, the Court stated that
the "reasonable relationship" test, then being used in
Utah — and the majority of other states, was ''closer
to the federal constitutional norm" than the other
tests. Id. at 391.The Court explained, however, that it
would not "adopt it as such, partly because the term
'reasonable relationship' seems confusingly similar
to the term 'rational basis' which describes the
minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."W. Instead,
the Court held, '4[w]e think a term such as 'rough
proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment."Id.
[3]f 8 Of course, the Court did not mean rough
proportionality- at all. While 1 to 1 is a proportion, so
is 1 to 1000. as any fifth grade student will be happy
to tell you. Any two numbers, measured by the same

units, form a proportion. So to be roughly
proportional literally means to be roughly related, not
necessarily roughly equivalent, which is the concept
the Court seemed to be trying to describe. The
proportion of 1 to 1.01 is roughly equivalent, while
the proportion of 1 to 3 is not, for example.
Unfortunately, by using the phrase "rough
proportionality," the Court has engendered vast
confusion about just what the municipalities and
courts are expected to evaluate when extracting
action or value from a land owner trying to improve
real property. In this instance, rather than adopting
the name chosen b> the United States Supreme Court,
we will use the more workable description of rough
equivalence, on the assumption that it represents
what the Dolan Court actually meant.
^ 9 After deciding on what to call the analysis, the
Court explained what it entailed: In order for an
exaction to be constitutional, a municipality must
make some determination "that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development."W. (emphases
added). The Dolan analysis thus has two aspects:
first, the exaction and impact must be related in
nature; second, they must be related in extent.
[4]f 10 A court engaging in a Dolan analysis must
first determine, therefore, whether the nature of the
exaction and impact are related. One method that
other courts have adopted to determine this
relationship is to look at the exaction and impact in
terms of a solution and a problem, respectively.—
We agree that the impact is the problem, or the
burden that the community will bear because of the
development. The exaction should address the
problem. If it does, then the nature component has
been satisfied.
1[ 11 The second component of the Dolan analysis is
whether the exaction and impact are related in extent.
This requirement implies that both the exaction and
the impact should be measured in the same manner,
or using the same standard. The most appropriate
measure is cost-specifically, the cost of the exaction
and the impact to the developer and the municipality,
respectively. The impact of the development can be
measured as the cost to the municipality of assuaging
the impact. Likewise, the exaction can be measured
as the value of the land to be dedicated by the
developer at the time of the exaction, along with any
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other costs required by the exaction. Our trial courts
are very adept at figuring out costs in similar
situations, and are more than capable of adjudging
the cost of each factor in this context.
*3 [5jf 12 After determining the cost to each party,
the final step of the extent component of the Do/an
analysis is simple: The trial court must determine
whether the costs to each party are roughly
equivalent.—Because each factor is measured the
same way, in dollars, this calculation should be very
simple. If the two sums are about the same, they are
roughly equivalent for this purpose.
[6]^ 13 With this framework in mind, applying the
Dolan analysis becomes a relatively straightforward
task. First the trial court must determine whether the
exaction and impact are related in nature-or whether
the solution (the exaction) directly addresses the
specific problem (the impact). Second, the trial court
must determine what the cost of dealing with the
impact would be to the County, absent any exaction;
— what the cost of the exaction would be to the
developer; and whether the two costs are roughly
equivalent. The trial court, despite a valiant effort to
divine the application of Dolan's
"rough
proportionalityv test, did not correctly apply the
Dolan analysis because it failed to compare
respective costs of the exaction and impact to the
parties.

Page 4

alternatively. 1.89% of the total land of the
development, 2.22% of the developers'
available lots, 1.38% of the total area of the
road after widening, or 2.01% of the total
expanded area of the road. B.A.M., on the
other hand, argues that ihe exaction is
grossly disproportionate to the impact
because the exaction results, alternatively, in
a 300% increase in the road's carrying
capacity a 300% increase in the road width,
or a payment of 100% of the road
improvement costs.
FNl.See, e g, Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S.
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 902-05 (Utah
1981).
FN3.See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas County,
127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742
(Wash. 1995) (stating that an exaction must
be "reasonably calculated to prevent or
compensate for, adverse public impacts of
the proposed development'* (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Burton v.
Clark County 91 Wash.App. 505, 958 P.2d
343. 354 (Wash.Ct.App 1998) C[T]he
government must show that its proposed
solution to the identified public problem is
"roughly proportional' to that part of the
problem that is created or exacerbated by the
landowner's development/*).

CONCLUSION
% 14 The Dolan analysis, properly applied, asks
whether the imposition on the community of a
proposed development is roughly equal to the cost
being extracted to offset it. We hold that the trial
court applied the Dolan analysis incorrectly, and we
reverse and remand the trial court's decision for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1j 15 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Judge
McHUGH concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion.
^ 16 Justice NEHRING does not participate herein;
Court of Appeals Judge CAROLYN B. McHUGH
sat.
FN1. For example, the County argues that
the exaction is roughly proportionate to the
impact because the exaction represents,

FN4. As the Court noted in Dolan, exact
equality between the factors is unnecessary.
Dolan v. City ofTizard, 512 U.S. 374, 391,
114 S.Ct. 2309. 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994)
("No precise mathematical calculation is
required ....**); see also Banberry, 631 P.2d
at 904 ("Precise mathematical equality *is
neither feasible nor constitutionally vital* "'
(quoting Airwick Indus., Inc. v. Carlstadt
Sewerage Auth., 57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18,
26 (NJ. 1970))).
FN5. It is unclear from the record whether
the maintenance of 3500 South is the
responsibility of the County or of the Utah
Department of Transportation (UDOT). If
widening the road is UDOT's responsibility,
then the County arguably would bear no cost
resulting from the development's impact.
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and therefore any exaction relating to the
traffic increase would exceed the Dolan
standard If the impact does not affect the
County, then it has no right to require the
developer to contribute
Utah,2008.
B.A.M Development, L.L.C v Salt Lake County
... p j d „.., 2008 WL 2726956 (Utah), 2008 UT 45
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and
Appellee.
No. 20070137.
July 15,2008.
Opinion amended October 24, 2008. For amended
opinion, see 2008 WL 4682267.
Utah,2008.
B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County
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H
Supreme Court of Utah.
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and
Appellee.
No. 20070137.
Oct. 24, 2008.
Background: Developer appealed denial of license
due to its objection to dedicating additional land for
expanded roadway. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., found in
favor of county. Developer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 87 P.3d 710, reversed and remanded with
directions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., 128 P.3d 1161,
held that the "rough proportionality" test governed
county's exaction of portion of developer's property. The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake
Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied developer's claim. Developer appealed.
Holding: The Supreme Court, Wilkms, J., held that
court's "rough proportionality" analysis should
have been a "rough equivalency" test that compared
respective costs of municipally required exaction
and its impact to developer and county.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes

Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases
Whether the proper analysis was applied by a
trial court is a mixed question of law and fact.
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €^>863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
When the legal concept of a case is easily
defined and the case involves important constitutional property concerns, the standard of review is
correctness.
[3] Eminent Domain 148 €=>2.10(7)
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Conditions. Most Cited Cases
"Rough proportionality" test to determine constitutionality of a municipally required exaction requires a "rough equivalence" comparison of respective costs and impact of exaction on parties.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

[11 Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(9)

[41 Eminent Domain 148 ©^>2.10(7)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether

148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
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196 P.3d 601, 615 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 2008 UT 74
(Cite as: 196 P.3d 601)
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Conditions. Most Cited Cases
A court engaging in analysis of the constitutionality of a municipally required exaction must
determine (1) whether the nature of the exaction
and impact are related, (2) whether the exaction and
impact are related in extent, either by measuring
cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact, or
by measuring the value of the land to be dedicated
by the developer at the time of the exaction, and,
(3) whether the costs to each party are roughly
equivalent. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
[5] Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7)
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Conditions. Most Cited Cases
If the costs to each party are about the same,
they are "roughly equivalent" for the purpose of
analyzing the constitutionality of a municipally required exaction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
[61 Eminent Domain 148 €=>2.10(7)
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Conditions. Most Cited Cases
To determine constitutionality of a municipally
required exaction, trial court should have carried
out a "rough equivalency" analysis by comparing
respective costs of municipally required exaction
and its impact to developer and county. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
*602 Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for plaintiff.

Lohra L. Miller, Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake City,
for defendant.

AMENDED OPINION
WILKINS, Justice:
K 1 Appellant B.A.M. Development alleges that
the trial court incorrectly applied the "rough proportionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304
(1994), in examining whether an exaction required
of the developer by Appellee Salt Lake County was
an unconstitutional taking. We hold that the trial
court did not apply the correct analysis, and thus reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
K 2 In 1997, B.A.M. Development (B.A.M.)
sought approval from Salt Lake County to build a
residential development. The County informed
B.A.M. that approval was conditioned upon B.A.M.
expanding the current width of the major road bordering the proposed development (3500 South)
from seventeen feet "half-width" (approximately 34
feet in total width) to 40 feet half-width. Later, in
accordance with changes to the County's master
traffic plan, the County told B.A.M. that it would
be required to increase the street to 53 feet halfwidth. This additional exaction of 13 feet, B.A.M.
alleges, represents an unconstitutional taking.
1} 3 After appealing the County's decision
through administrative channels, B.A.M. sued the
County, seeking either to escape the exaction or to
receive just compensation for the alleged taking.
After losing in the trial court, B.A.M. appealed to
the court of appeals and then to this court.
11 4 In a prior decision on this same case, this
court held that the trial court should use the "rough
proportionality" analysis in Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304
(1994), to determine whether the exaction was an
unconstitutional taking. B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt
Lake County, 2006 UT 2, % 46, 128 P.3d 1161. On
remand, the trial court again denied B.A.M.'s
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claims. B.A.M. now appeals from that decision.
ANALYSIS
[1][2] Tf 5 The dispute between the parties is
whether the trial court correctly applied the "rough
proportionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d
304 (1994). Whether the proper analysis was applied is a mixed question of law and fact. In this
case, because "the legal concept is easily defined"
and because the case involves important constitutional property concerns, the standard of review is
correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, fflf 23-24,
144 P.3d 1096 ("Discretion is most confined—and
the standard of review is nondeferential—when the
legal concept is easily defined by appellate courts
or when appellate courts erect strict fences for
policy reasons.").
If 6 In Dolan, the United States Supreme Court
held that a municipally required exaction*603 must
be roughly proportionate to the impact of the development; otherwise, the exaction is an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309 ("We
think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of
the Fifth Amendment."). The Dolan analysis requires a court to examine two factors, the exaction
and the development's impact, and to determine
whether the two are in rough proportionality. In this
case, both parties effectively agree that one of those
factors—the impact of the development—is a
3.04% increase in traffic along 3500 South. The
parties disagree on the other factor, however, as
well as whether the two are roughly proportionate.FN1
FN1. For example, the County argues that
the exaction is roughly proportionate to the
impact because the exaction represents, alternatively, 1.89% of the total land of the
development, 2.22% of the developers'
available lots, 1.38% of the total area of
the road after widening, or 2.01% of the
total expanded area of the road. B.A.M., on

S 2011 Thomson Reuters.

the other hand, argues that the exaction is
grossly disproportionate to the impact because the exaction results, alternatively, in
a 300% increase in the road's carrying capacity, a 300% increase in the road width,
or a payment of 100% of the road improvement costs.
f 7 A closer examination of Dolan clarifies
how to determine whether the two factors are
roughly proportionate. In Dolan, the Court looked
first to how the states had approached the issue of
exactions as unconstitutional takings. See id. at
389-91, 114 S.Ct. 2309. After examining various
approaches, the Court stated that the "reasonable
relationship" test, then being used in Utah FN2 and
the majority of other states, was "closer to the federal constitutional norm" than the other tests. Id. at
391, 114 S.Ct. 2309. The Court explained,
however, that it would not "adopt it as such, partly
because the term 'reasonable relationship' seems
confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis'
which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. Instead, the Court held, "[w]e
think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of
the Fifth Amendment." Id.
FN2. See, e.g., Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S.
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 902-05 (Utah
1981).
[3] ^[ 8 Of course, the Court did not mean rough
proportionality at all. While 1 to 1 is a proportion,
so is 1 to 1000, as any fifth grade student will be
happy to tell you. Any two numbers, measured by
the same units, form a proportion. So to be roughly
proportional literally means to be roughly related,
not necessarily roughly equivalent, which is the
concept the Court seemed to be trying to describe.
The proportion of 1 to 1.01 is roughly equivalent,
while the proportion of 1 to 3 is not, for example.
Unfortunately, by using the phrase "rough proportionality," the Court has engendered vast confusion
about just what the municipalities and courts are
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expected to evaluate when extracting action or
value from a land owner trying to improve real
property. In this instance, rather than adopting the
name chosen by the United States Supreme Court,
we will use the more workable description of rough
equivalence, on the assumption that it represents
what the Dolan Court actually meant.
H 9 After deciding on what to call the analysis,
the Court explained what it entailed: In order for an
exaction to be constitutional, a municipality must
make some determination "that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. (emphases
added). The Dolan analysis thus has two aspects:
first, the exaction and impact must be related in
nature; second, they must be related in extent.
[4] \ 10 A court engaging in a Dolan analysis
must first determine, therefore, whether the nature
of the exaction and impact are related. One method
that other courts have adopted to determine this relationship is to look at the exaction and impact in
terms of a solution and a problem, respectively.
FN3 w e a g r e e that the impact is the *604 problem,
or the burden that the community will bear because
of the development. The exaction should address
the problem. If it does, then the nature component
has been satisfied.
FN3. See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas County,
111 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742
(1995) (stating that an exaction must be
"reasonably calculated to prevent, or compensate for, adverse public impacts of the
proposed development" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Burton v.
Clark County, 91 Wash.App. 505, 958
P.2d 343, 354 (1998) ( "[T]he government
must show that its proposed solution to the
identified public problem is 'roughly proportional' to that part of the problem that is
created or exacerbated by the landowner's
development.").
f 11 The second component of the Dolan ana-

lysis is whether the exaction and impact are related
in extent. This requirement implies that both the exaction and the impact should be measured in the
same manner, or using the same standard. The most
appropriate measure is cost—specifically, the cost
of the exaction and the impact to the developer and
the municipality, respectively. The impact of the
development can be measured as the cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact. Likewise, the
exaction can be measured as the value of the land to
be dedicated by the developer at the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the
exaction. Our trial courts are very adept at figuring
out costs in similar situations, and are more than
capable of adjudging the cost of each factor in this
context.
[5] U 12 After determining the cost to each
party, the final step of the extent component of the
Dolan analysis is simple: The trial court must determine whether the costs to each party are roughly
equivalent.^4 Because each factor is measured
the same way, in dollars, this calculation should be
very simple. If the two sums are about the same,
they are roughly equivalent for this purpose.
FN4. As the Court noted in Dolan, exact
equality between the factors is unnecessary. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304
(1994) ("No precise mathematical calculation is required ...."); see also Banberry,
631 P.2d at 904 ("Precise mathematical
equality i s neither feasible nor constitutionally vital/ " (quoting Airwick Indus.,
Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Auth., 57 N.J.
107, 270 A.2d 18, 26 (1970))).
[6] % 13 With this framework in mind, applying
the Dolan analysis becomes a relatively straightforward task. First, the trial court must determine
whether the exaction and impact are related in
nature—or whether the solution (the exaction) directly addresses the specific problem (the impact).
Second, the trial court must determine what the cost
of dealing with the impact would be to the County,
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absent any exaction; what the cost of the exaction
would be to the developer; and whether the two
costs are roughly equivalent. The trial court, despite
a valiant effort to divine the application of Dolan's
"rough proportionality" test, did not correctly apply
the Dolan analysis because it failed to compare respective costs of the exaction and impact to the
parties.
CONCLUSION
f 14 The Dolan analysis, properly applied, asks
whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is roughly equal to the cost being extracted to offset it. We hold that the trial
court applied the Dolan analysis incorrectly, and
we reverse and remand the trial court's decision for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
If 15 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Judge
McHUGH concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion.
K 16 Justice NEHRING does not participate herein;
Court of Appeals Judge CAROLYN B. McHUGH
sat.
Utah,2008.
B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County
196 P.3d 601, 615 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 2008 UT 74
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1 I

J. CRAIG SMITH

2 !

having been first duly sworn, testified

3

upon his oath as follows:

4 I
5

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOMER:

6

Q

Will you state your name please?

7

A

It's Craig Smith and I have a first initial J. for

8

John which I have never gone by but you know, when you're

9

named Smith you don't typically go by John.

10

THE COURT:

11

THE WITNESS:

12

Makes perfect sense to me.

(Laughter).

Not unless you want to checked on a

lot of things.

13

Q

14

(BY MR. HOMER)

Mr. Smith, would you state your

business address?

15 I
16

A

My business address is 215 South State Street,

Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Utah.

17 I

Q

And in what business are you located?

18 I

A

I'm a partner in the law firm of Smith, Hartvigsen.

19

Q

So you're not merely a partner, you're a principal.

20

A

I started the thing in 2002, me and a few other

21 i people.
22

Q

And so implies that you are an attorney; is that

23 ' correct?
i

24 |

A

That's correct.

Q

Would you tell us what your academic training has

t

25 I
i
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been?
A

Yeah, going back to - I'll try to make this quick

'cause I know we've all been here a long time and would like
to get things done and I would too. I grew up down in Carbon
County, born in Price, went to high school, graduated from
the College of Eastern Utah, continued my education at
Brigham Young University.

They offered me a better

scholarship than the U, so that's where I ended up.

Same

with law school, they gave me a better scholarship.

I went

to law school.

While I was in law school, I graduated in the

year 1983 from law school.

I became very interested in two

areas of law that unlike most people who are interested in
something in law school, do something different when they get
in practice, I have maintained in that one and that is land
use, zoning and the other one is water law and got
interested, took the classes that were available in those
areas.

Do you want me to finish with experience or just

stick with education?
Q

Let's hold it to the education.

Have you attended

courses subsequent to your graduation from the academic
institutions you've been in?
A
have CLE.

Took many courses.

Obviously attorneys need to

I taught many courses on land use.

Interestingly

enough I was going through my old files because we're going
to move to the Walker Building in a month or two with our
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offices, got a new lease there, it's just about a block away
is all but still a move is a move.

So I was looking back and

I started teaching land use course I believe in 1994. I
didn't realize it had been that long and have taught those
consistently ever since, teaching them still to this day to
lawyers, planners, others that are interested in land use.

I

taught courses regularly for those.
Q

Okay.

Tell us what your work experience, your

professional work experience has been.
A

Okay.

Starting in law school I was research

assistant to Eugene Jacobs who was the local government and
land use professor at BYU at the time.

I did that because as

I mentioned, I got very interested and for some reason I
still don't understand why in water and land use law, worked
for him, learned a little bit about redevelopment law at the
time, also.

Then after I was done with law school I worked

for the Fourth District Court as a law clerk for Judge
Bullock, probably one of the smartest people and best judges
I've ever known.
THE COURT:

Not acquainted with him.

THE WITNESS:

This goes back a few years ago, Your

Honor.
And then I worked as acting city attorney, city
attorney for Park City for about five years after law school.
Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

Give us the years of those.
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A

That would have been from 1984 to 1989 and

obviously while I was in Park City it was during a period of
a lot of growth and a lot of that growth was Deer Valley was
just coming on line so I was involved in many land use issues
from all the way from the Planning Commission, City Council,
meeting with developers, you name it, all the way to court
cases, did the gambit of land use law while I was in Park
City.

Following working in Park City I worked for a firm

called Wheatley & Renquist which merged into Nielsen & Senior
and was at that firm from 1989 until 2002.

In 2002 I started

Smith Hartvigsen and that's where I have been employed ever
since.
Q

And is there any - terrible question.

Is there

anything else that you would feel that you would state as far
as your qualifications to be here as an expert witness?
A

While at Smith, Hartvigsen and Nielsen & Senior,

I've continued to practice land use law in not just, I think
the thing that is unique about my background and that of my
J firm is we are probably the only firm that I'm aware of that
| work what I'll call both sides of the street.

We represent

I local government entities, we also represent developers.
I Currently I'm the City Attorney for about five small cities,
| Castle Dale, Orangeville, Corinne, Duchesne.

There's

i

, probably a couple more I've forgotten.

So I handle a lot of

! their land use questions and writing land use codes and
I
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ordinances for them.

Some of those cities are so small they

don't have a full-time planner so I have to help them with
some of the planning aspects of it which I've done over the
years.

At the same time we've also represented some of the

biggest developers in the state.
Another project that I think is probably somewhat
significant to'what we're doing here is the (inaudible)
Resort that has just opened in Southern Utah.

We did all of

the water law and land entitlement for that resort.

That's a

$150 million resort that's probably the nicest resort - I
don't know if anybody has ever heard of it, it's really high
end.

It's down in Kane County by Big Water.

We actually had

to create an address because they didn't want the Big Water
address but it's a - I worked on that for about seven years.
It opened last October and did all of the entitlement work,
working with the county, working creating districts.
their local government entities rewrite their code.

We had
That's

just some of the experience I've had in the areas of land
use.
THE COURT:

Mr. Homer, may I ask a question?

MR. HOMER:

Sure.

THE COURT:

What's the significance of your pin?

THE WITNESS:
son has autism.

I'm glad you asked that.

My youngest

This is autism awareness month.

It was last

month but I've still be wearing the pin.
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. HOMER:

I looked at it.

I thought it was

either a puzzle piece or a (inaudible) captain's designation.
THE WITNESS:

I get asked that a lor but - and if I

have to come back tomorrow I may not be able to be here until
9:30 because I have to take my son to school tomorrow.
hopefully we'll get done.
Q

So

If not...

(BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, you've been "hen retained

by Mr. McCleary or his company to appear in this case as an
expert witness.
A

That' s correct.

Q

And your involvement began last summer, correct?

A

Yeah, you contacted me and asked me if I would be

interested in acting as an expert witness.
case I believe over the phone initially.

We discussed the
Then we met and

discussed it further and I agreed to work with you on that
case after learning about it.
Q

And you have prepared a written report that has -

well, you prepared a written report on that assignment?
A

That's correct.

I'll get it in front of me 'cause

I'm sure you're going to ask me questions about it but I did
do an expert witness report, prepared that last summer and
submitted that to you and I believe onto the Court.
MR. HOMER:

Your Honor, may 1 approach?

THE COURT:

Of course.
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THE WITNESS: Do you want to have that marked.
2 !

MR. HOMER:

Your Honor, we'd move to have that

3 I marked and I lost track of what number but it's about
4 j (inaudible) 64 I think.
5

Excuse me P-64.

Wait a minute,

we're going to be - sorry.

6 I
7

THE COURT:

We need to make sure we're not using

the same numbers.

8 j

MR. HOMER:

How about if it's P-126?

9

THE COURT:

You want this to be the original?

10

MR. HOMER:

We want it so that you will have it,

11

Your Honor. So yes, that could be marked.

12

Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

So Mr. Smith, the expert witness

13

report that the clerk has just handed to the Judge and vice

14

versa, that is then a clean copy of your report?

15 j
16

A

Yeah, that's a true and correct copy of the expert

report that we prepared and submitted to the Court.

17

MR. HOMER:

18

Your Honor, we'd move to admit his

report, 126.

19

MR. HANSEN:

20

Your Honor, question in aid of

objection please.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22 J

VOIR DIRE

23 I BY MR. HANSEN:
24 I

Q

Good afternoon Mr. Smith, Don Hansen, we met —

A

Good afternoon.

!
I

25 j

You can call me, Craig, if you'd

!
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like, that's fine.
Q

All right, I'll do that.

Craig, you - and I want

you to understand this was with all due deference and respect
which is considerable.

Your professional skills and

reputation are very high.
A

Thank you, that's very kind.

Q

Have you ever served as an expert witness before?

A

I have but I didn't have to end up testifying

because the case settled the day of trial while I was waiting
to testify.
Q

What kind of a case was that?

A

It was a land use case.

Q

Was it a case in which you were testifying on

matters of policy or matters of fact or matters of law?
A

Well, geez, if I was smart enough to understand all

the differences between the nuances, I think there was
probably a mix of all three for different things.

I'm not

really - I wasn't really testifying of the law but the
practice and how things worked in a land use setting.
Q

Now we've heard about your educational background

and your work experience background.

Do you have any

training or experience as an engineer of any kind?
A

No, I'm not an engineer.

I do work a lot with

engineers because of my areas of practice, there's a very
fuzzy line between what engineers do, both in the water and
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1

in land use and what lawyers do.

2

collaboratively, if I can say that right, with engineers.

3

But no, I'm not an engineer, I do not - no (inaudible) on TV.

4
5
6

Q

So often I'm looking very

Did you have any training or experience as a urban

planner, land use planner or traffic planner?
A

I've taken classes in all those things but as far

7

as working in those fields, I've hired certainly a lot of

8

planners to work for me but I have not worked as a "planner."

9
10
11
12

Q

You've taken courses in traffic planning,

transportation planning?
A

Yeah, I went to seminars where they had classes in

transportation planning.

13

Q

Not university level classes?

14

A

No, not at a university.

15

Q

When have you taken transportation planning

16
17

courses?
A

Geez, I've probably taken - there's been aspect of

18

those probably all throughout the 20 plus five years that

19

I've been practicing law.

20

like that even when I was in Park City.

21

question that would come up when I worked at Park City with

I remember going to some things
That was a frequent

22 i traffic issues and so we felt like we needed to get some
23
24

training on that.
Q

You understand you are here to be, to testify as a

25 j rebuttal witness in rebuttal to the testimony of Mr. Taylor
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Dudley and that of John Nepstad that you've already heard?
A

Correct.

Q

Do you have any training or experience in land

development?
A

Yeah, I've worked in land development throughout my

whole career in representing developers in doing basically
what they do.

Also, I've had extensive land development

experience in representing redevelopment agencies.

I

currently represent, I don't know, five or si redevelopment
agencies in the state of Utah and for those who aren't
familiar with redevelopment law, it's basically where you
have a partnership between a private entity and the local
government to help fund something that otherwise wouldn't
happen.

I could point probably to 10 projects that you would

be aware of that have been built that I worked on extensively
as the agency counsel for the redevelopment agency.
Q

Do you have any training or experience in the field

of land development financial analysis?
A

Certainly have had occasions to use that.

I don't

know that I have specific training in that other than I took
accounting in college and have knowledge, you know, I
understand what a cap rate is and things like that, the
typical person down the street doesn't understand but I've
had to learn to understand those things to do the work I do.
MR. HANSEN: Okay.

Thank you very much, sir.
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Your Honor, the county objects to the admission of
this expert report on the grounds that the witness is not
qualified to serve in rebuttal to the testimony of either Mr.
Dudley or Mr. Nepstad.

That would be our first objection of

three.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's do them one at a time

because it's late enough that I'm not going to be able to
hold them all in my head.

That is to say, I think we need

t CDMR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Go ahead with the other two?
Well no, let me rule on each one 'cause

I'll drop something I'm quite sure.
is designated as a rebuttal witness.

But I have wondered, he
They had a motion to

have him not be allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness and
I indicated that if it was appropriate, he would be allowed
to, that is to say in rebuttal to something said and I notice
that he's been here throughout, almost the entire duration of
the trial but I am wondering if it's appropriate rebuttal
testimony.
MR. HOMER:

Your Honor, I think it is now that

we've actually heard the proffered evidence, testimonial
evidence, particularly from the county's witnesses, I think
if you listened carefully, both Mr. Dudley and more
specifically Mr. Nepstad, there was significant connection
to, I'll submit, issues of law and compliance with what is
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actually required here and I think if as I've analyzed this
as my earlier memo from the now denied motion,
disqualification motion, indicated, this whole issue, this
whole Dolan, Banbury issue is very, it's fact intensive but
it is a mix and the court cases, even the B.A.M. 3 case
characterizes this as the Dolan case as a mixed question of
law and fact or words to that effect. And —
THE COURT:

Sure, but I - the legal conclusions are

MR. HOMER:

I understand that, Your Honor, and we

up to me.

certainly recognize that as I'm sure does Mr. Smith.

You can

take what - as with any witness —
THE COURT:

Can you give me an example, a specific

example of an opinion of Mr. Nepstad that is going to be
rebutted by an opinion of Mr. Smith?
MR. HOMER:

Here would be generally the somewhat —

THE COURT:

I don't want general and ycu said if I

listened carefully but remember, that rebuttal is only
rebuttal.
THE WITNESS:

Your Honor, if I could be helpful to

the Court. . .
MR. HOMER:

Hold on a second, Craig.

THE COURT:

I want counsel to answer me.

THE WITNESS:

I just want to say it's in my report,

his opinions, my rebuttal to that.
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1 I

MR. HOMER:

Craig, just a minute.

2 '

THE COURT:

I haven't read it so...

3 |

MR. HOMER:

Okay, may I respond now?

4 '

THE COURT: Yes.

i
i

5 I

MR. HOMER:

I got in trouble with Judge Bryan once

6 ! for over speaking him.
7 I

Specifically Your Honor and this is one and I think
this is focused enough, Mr. Nepstad didn't do the, what I

9
call the Banbury elements, he didn't check on the cost of the
10
existing roadway prior to —
11
THE COURT:

Right.

So since he didn't, there's no

12
rebuttal.

I mean suppose he had and testified about that,

13
then that would be rebuttal. You see what I'm saying?
MR. HOMER: Sure. Okay.

14
15

THE COURT:

So can you give me another example?

16

MR. HOMER:

Well, I guess what I was going to say

17

was the reason that we've had Mr. Smith here, both in

18

engaging him to review and prepare the report that he did

19

against the report and so I guess —

20

THE COURT:

Sure, but that could have been an

21

expert witness on direct if appropriately designated at the

22

time.

23

be directly responsive to some sort of testimony and you know

I mean, lawyers do that all the time.

Rebuttal has to

24 | the case and it's possible that you're going to tell me that
i

25

;

it will be directly responsive to some piece of testimony but

I
I
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1 j it can't be directly responsive to something that wasn't his
testimony.
MR. HOMER:

Okay, let me see if I can help us here.

Mr. Smith was hired by the plaintiff in this rebuttal thing.
They came in with their expert first, we saw theirs and we
said, Okay, here's where we think the problems are.

He has a

year ago written this expert witness report.
THE COURT:

Sure.

Then why isn't he designated in

your case in chief, it would be totally appropriate in your
case in chief?
MR. HOMER:

We didn't do it that way, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay, in which case you're limited to

rebutting some piece of evidence that has come in on direct.
If you're going to do that, I'm going to allow you to do that
because that's appropriate, but as I indicated the other day
it's only appropriate if it's truly rebuttal.
MR. HOMER:

And I guess my point is in a general

sense is, that being the case which I understand what the
Court is saying I believe, let's let him testify and if it
meets the Court's prequalification threshold thei it comes
in.
THE COURT:

Well, I want you to proffer what

exactly it is and it needs to be more specific than if I
listened closely enough I'll find it.
MR. HOMER:

Let me ask you this because Mr. - even
210
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though we've been in contact with each other, I have not
attempted to restrict or even guide Mr. Smirh in his
evaluation of this.

He has heard as you noted, much of the

testimony that has been stated.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. HOMER:

And so to ask him - I mean, I'll have

to be candid, I'm going to ask him, okay, what is wrong with
what Mr. Nepstad said, how is that in error.
THE COURT:

Right, and that would be -

MR. HOMER:

What needs to be rebutted?

THE COURT:

In general, that might be appropriate

but you can't - the examples you've given me, the only
example you've given me is that he's going to rebut what Mr.
Nepstad didn't say and that's not proper.

You could do that

in your case in chief but you didn't and so rebuttal has to
be responsive to some MR. HOMER:

Let me try this.

Nepstad did not take

into account the financial impact from these taxation
resources which we think Banbury makes it be considered.
THE COURT:

Right, but then that's a criticism of

Mr. Nepstad, it's not a rebuttal of Mr. Nepstad and as I
said, it would be appropriate in your case in chief but it's
not rebuttal.

What I'm going to do is take a 10-minute break

and you can confer with your witness for a few minutes and
see if you can give me a good example.

Okay?
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MR. HOMER:

All right, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Whereupon a recess was taken)
THE COURT:

Mr. Homer?

MR. HOMER:

Your Honor, I talked to Mr. Smith now

and he's identified the things that I think are subject to
rebuttal.

I will read briefly from his report if only

because that helps me identify what I believe his testimony
will be.
MR. HANSEN:
that.

Your Honor, I had a concern about

If the report is not to be entered in the record, I

don't think that verbatim quotations —
MR. HOMER:
MR. HANSEN:
MR. HOMER:

I'm not doing that.
- should be either.
I won't do that, Your Honor.

I'm just

the listing of things - the Court asked MR. HANSEN:

He said he was going to read from it.

MR. HOMER:

I using the report to help me remember

what these issues are.
THE COURT:

Can you just without reading it me,

take a look at it and then tell me?
MR. HOMER:

I'm not going to quote it to Your

Honor, I'm just - he has identified things, okay?
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. HOMER:

The Court's inquiry of me is okay, what
212
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are the specific, at least one factual issues that Mr.
Smith's testimony would be used for to rebut specific
elements of in the record evidence, not the absence of the
record, but in the record.

One would be some of the core

issues are is the exaction related in scope and nature.
THE COURT:

They stipulated it's related in nature.

So I don't think we need to rebut that, right?

They've

stipulated.
MR. HOMER:

Well, I think the stipulation was in

the context of trying to get through to what the elements of
the case were about.
MR. HANSEN:

Mr. —
Wait a second, wait a second.

Do we

have a stipulation or don't we?
MR. HOMER:

Yeah, we do have stipulation.

We have

all kinds of stipulations.
MR. HANSEN:
one very crucial one.
MR. HOMER:

No, we don't have all kinds.

We had

Now do we have it or not?
We do have that one if that's the one

you're talking about.
THE COURT:

So why are we rebutting it?

MR. HOMER:

No. Well, I think the stipulation that

the Court is referring to and you correct me if I'm
incorrect, Your Honor, is not this fundamental stipulation
about the cost or the other people, that's not the one I
think you were referring to.

The one I thought you were
213
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referring to was when we were talking about THE COURT:

Exaction is roughly proportionate

nature and extent to impact the proposed development.

m
That's

the nature is stipulated.
MR. HOMER:

All right.

THE COURT:

So, we don't need rebuttal.

MR. HOMER:

The second is that he would directly

rebut Mr. Nepstad's testimony, his expert witness conclusion
that the exaction that is imposed against B.A.M., that that
is related in extent, in other words the qualitative side of
things, the scope, related in scope I think is the case law
term.

He would rebut that.

I think his report was prepared

with that actually in mind, okay?

In essence, he would

testify against what Nepstad said, this has always been our
view of this, Nepstad's report and his testimony was this was
okay.

Mr. Smith will testify, no, it wasn't okay —
THE COURT:

But -

MR. HOMER:

- and here's why.

THE COURT:

- will he be testifying in rebuttal to

the cost to the government?
MR. HOMER:

He probably will have an - I would

assume he has an opinion on that and —
THE COURT:

Don't you know?

MR. HOMER:

Well, that cost to government, Your

Honor, that's kind of a fuzzy term that Mr. Hansen and his
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people have invented.

Yes, I believe he will talk about the

cost to the government and I hope that his testimony is that
it will get us back on track —
THE COURT:

But he's your expert, don't you know,

MR. HOMER:

Yes, I do know Your Honor.

Mr. Homer?
I'm sorry.

I don't mean to talk in terms that I don't know what he's
going to say.

By the same token I have not tried to control

him in the exercise of —
THE COURT:

Sure, okay.

And is he going to rebut

the five percent anticipated growth figure?

I mean, all of

these sound like out side of his area of expertise anyway but
you're familiar with —
MR. HOMER:

They're no more outside of his

expertise - Mr. Nepstad testified himself, he's not an
engineer, how does he get to come in and —
THE COURT:

He testified how he arrived at that

five percent figure.
MR. HOMER:

And I think Mr. Smith will be able to

testify why that is inaccurate.
THE COURT:

Is he going to be rebut the conclusion

of Mr. Nepstad that the cost is roughly equivalent to the
cost of the exaction, the cost of the impact is roughly
equivalent to the cost of —
MR. HOMER:

I believe that he will.

Yes he will,
215

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 • Your Honor.
2 j

THE COURT:

Is that in his report?

3 !

MR. HOMER:

I believe that it is, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay, tell me where it is.

5 j

MR. HOMER:

Craig, help me if you will.

6 I

THE WITNESS:

i

4 j
i

I think that's Point Sub-5 on Page 6,

7 j Your Honor.
8 j
9

MR. HOMER:

Six, number 5, the impact and exaction

are not related in extent because there is no cost to the

10 | county.
11

Nepstad, I believe has been sent down the wrong road

as far as he's been misled as to what B.A.M. —

12 I

THE COURT:

There again, we get back to -

13 j

MR. HOMER:

It's argument.

14 j

THE COURT:

Well, you can make argument but the

15

thing is if you're criticizing what Mr. Nepstad didn't do,

16

that's part of your case in chief, that's not rebuttal.

It

17 I should have been.
18 j
MR. HOMER: I guess my point is, Your Honor, we're
19 j not criticizing what he didn't do particularly as much as
20 j we're criticizing what he actually did.
21

He's come into court

and said this (inaudible) this column is not excessive, it

22 ! doesn't offend the cost to the government idea.

He is wrong

!

23 ' in that assertion —
i
!

24
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, could I have a chance to
25 i get in here some time?
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THE COURT:

I'll let you respond in a minute.

Let's let Mr. Homer finish.
MR. HOMER:

I guess my point is we've done what we

have done, the report was given to them 14 months ago, 10
months ago, I lose track.
THE COURT:

I understand that but this sounds like

part of your case in chief.

It should have been part of your

case in chief and just because they've had the report for a
long time, I mean, I was willing to say, okay, this can be
rebuttal, they're not surprised by the content of it, if it's
appropriate rebuttal but I am not going to turn rules of
civil procedure completely on their head.

So rebuttal —

MR. HOMER:

And Your Honor -

THE COURT:

- should be confined to responding to

something that a witness has said.
MR. HOMER:

And that is exactly why we had

characterized it as rebuttal and —
THE COURT:

But usually rebuttal is short.

This

man started testifying some time before 4:00 and expressed
some concern that he wouldn' t finish in the hour and a
quarter and I realize we're whittling that way down very
quickly right now but we need to get this worked out.
MR. HOMER:

Here would be my -

THE COURT:

So rebuttal witnesses are usually a few

minutes, responding to a statement or two; whereas he's
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coming in with a whole big report, some of which may be not,
it may not be improper as rebuttal but most of which it sound
to me is.

So, it really looks to me as though this man

should have been designated as an expert witness and part of
your case in chief.

Experts trade, you know, opinions back

and forth all the time.

I try cases all the time with the

plaintiff's expert responding to what the defendant's expert
said and not doing it on rebuttal.
MR. HOMER:

Sure.

THE COURT:

So that wasn't done here and you're

asking me essentially to let him come in as a witness,
designated as a rebuttal witness who is in fact just
basically somebody who should have been designated in your
case in chief.
MR. HOMER:
evaluation.
that.

I'm sorry the Court has that

I'm not sorry - I understand the Court's view of

My view of that is this, as this case came back for

remand activities, judicial activities on the remand, I
thought and have maintained for some time and more
specifically in light of the Ivers case, that the remand
decision made things very, very narrow and it should be
essentially that free element, mathematical look at cost to
the county, cost to the B.A.M., that comparison.
it's that simple.

I think

The Court has kind of expanded that way

beyond that narrowness that I think the court in its mandate
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language as I call it, has set for us and it's kind of taken
almost the whole waterfront and the Court I believe in
fairness to the parties has kind of left it wide open if only
you said, I want to hear it all and then I'll sort it out.
THE COURT:

And part of the reason I have done that

is you all have done this two or three times and I'm new to
the party here.

So I frankly have a much better

understanding of this case after two days of trial than I did
dealing with your motions episodically.

But, here's the

thing, if he needed to be part of your case in chief, he
should have been part of your case in chief.
MR. HOMER:

But as a rebuttal, Your Honor, he

wasn't part of our case in chief because there was nothing to
rebut.

He couldn't be a rebuttal witness - he could be an

expert in the way that you set it up.
be an expert.

Presumptively he could

We didn't characterize him as an expert

because that probably, I mean, who knows depending on what
Mr. Nepstad and the other witness, Mr. Dudley said.

We kind

of didn't know although we had a pretty good estimate of what
they might say but he really is a rebuttal and to say, well,
he should have been at the front side of the case, well, I'm
- I understand that the Court's view of this but that in and
of itself shouldn't make the actual rebuttal category that I
think Mr. Smith fits into.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let me hear from Mr.
219
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Hansen.
MR. HANSEN:

May I address the witness for just a

moment?
THE COURT:

Sure.
VOIR DIRE

BY MR. HANSEN:
Q

Mr. Smith, you are aware that that Mr. Nepstad

(inaudible) concluded that the grand total for government
cost to do a highway expanding project on 3500 South between
7100 West and 8000 West would be approximately $6.5 million,
you're aware of that?
A

Yeah.

I'm aware of that testimony.

Q

Do you have factual testimony that (inaudible) to

dispute that?
A

Yeah, that figure should be zero and the reason

that Q

(Inaudible) -

A

Let me finish my answer.

answer.

You asked the question.

Let me finish that
That figure should be zero

because there's no cost to the county.
Q

That's a purely legal argument.

A

No, that's not a legal argument but take it for

what it's worth.
Q

(Inaudible)?

A

That says government but that is with a big XG'
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1 ! which I think it implies it's the county's cost...
2

Q

(Inaudible).

3

A

First of all, excuse me Mr. Hansen, if I could

4 | finish my answers I think we'll have a better record and I
5 | don't want to get adversarial here but I don't like to be cut
6 j off.
7 j

Q

The question what was (inaudible) and you answered

A

And it says estimate government costs, that implies

that.
9 |

10 j to me as someone whose worked in it —
11
12
13

Q

Now (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Please don't argue with him.

I would

like to hear his answer but I will note that it was a title

14 | and it's common to capitalize the big words in a title.

Do

15 I you follow what I'm saying.
16 I
17

THE WITNESS:
way, Your Honor.

No, I think it could be read either

I think it's very confusing the way it's

18 | been presented.
19 I

THE COURT:

Cost usually isn't capitalized, right?

20 j

THE WITNESS:

21 I

THE COURT:

Right.
So I don't think this could be read

22 I either way, it would look weird if they put a lower case.
23 |
24
25

THE WITNESS:

Yeah, and if I can just answer the

question, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

Sure,
221
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THE WITNESS:

I think Mr. Feldstadt, I'll probably

get it wrong.
THE COURT:

Nepstad.

THE WITNESS:

Nepstad, I think Mr. Nepstad one of

his areas of testimony which he testified and gave an answer
to Your Honor was does it make a difference whether it's the
county or some other entity of government?
Hansen asked him that question.
make a difference.

I believe Mr.

His answer was no it didn't

My rebuttal testimony to that would be

yes it does make a difference.
MR. HANSEN:

And I don't think -

THE WITNESS:

Again, let me finish my answer and

Mr. Hansen, I can see you're excited —
MR. HANSEN:

The answer is going far beyond the

question.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Well Let's hear what he has to say.

THE WITNESS:
difference.

And his answer was it made no

My answer is makes all the world of difference

and in my view I don't see how he can testify to that and I
can't rebut it.

But that's just my -

THE COURT:
of that sort.

You know what, I will allcw testimony

We'll resume tomorrow at 9:30 but I'm not

taking a big report with a lot of argument in it.

So if you

» have specific facts to show me how that is incorrect, I will
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allow you to testify to those facts.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

But they've got to be in this report so

that they have a fair idea of what it is you will be
testifying to.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Okay.
It's just that I don't want to accept

the report since the report goes beyond the scope of what I'm
allowing you to do.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I think that's fine.

So everything has to be extracted from

this so that you'll know how to cross examine.
MR. HANSEN:

If I understand this, the Court is

withholding ruling for the time being on the admissibility of
the report until it hears the testimony on those questions?
THE COURT:

No, I'm not going to accept the report.

MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Okay.
But I will allow him to make his, to

give his opinion that, and this is just an example, say you
disagree with under improvements, where it says construction
costs, if you disagree with that figure, tell us why you
disagree with and what you think it should be.
THE WITNESS:

That would be fine, Your Honor.

I

think that's all I've ever tried to do in this case.
THE COURT:

I will allow you to do that but I think
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1

the report from the little bit I've looked at it, goes way

2

beyond that.

3

report but I'm not going to receive the report.

So whatever you say tomorrow has to be in the

4

THE WITNESS:

5

THE COURT:

6
7
8
9

Fair enough.

Okay?

All right, so 9:30.

And then

gentlemen, before you leave, is he the last witness?
MR. HOMER:

I think so, maybe Mr. McCleary just

very, very briefly.
THE COURT:

Okay.

We will be finished by 11:30 and

10

then I am going to expect your closing argument in written

11

form, 15 pages maximum a week from tomorrow and the county's

12

15 pages maximum a week after that.

13

dates are, it's June something.

14

MR. HOMER:

Friday, Friday.

15

THE COURT:

Yeah.

I don't know what those

And then on the following

16

Wednesday, whatever date that is, five pages of rebuttal.

17

will also expect simultaneous submission of findings of fact

18

and conclusions of law and you two can propose findings of

19

fact, conclusions of law.

20

you think it would appropriate but I'm not anticipating that

21

be a responsive thing, it's just hand it in.

22
23

MR. HOMER:

I

You two can confer on what date

Now Your Honor, clarification, are

those findings, are they separate documents?

24

THE COURT:

Yes.

25

MR. HOMER:

You don't want them combined?

They're
224
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separate.
THE COURT:

The findings of fact and conclusions of

law can be one document.
MR. HOMER:

The closing argument is separate.

Within the party itself.

So I'm not

combining my proposed findings with his?
THE COURT:
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

No.
We each are to submit those.
You are each to do it and I anticipate

that being done simultaneously.
MR. HOMER:

With the submission of the argument?

THE COURT:

No, with one another.

Pick a date that

you want to submit the findings and conclusions and you're
both to turn them in the same day.

Okay?

But I don't care

personally what day that is as long as it' s no later than the
day the rebuttal is due.
MR. HANSEN:

The reply memo.

Okay.

THE COURT:

The reply, sorry.

MR. HOMER:

Okay, tomorrow, 9:30 a.m. Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. HOMER:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Yeah.

(Whereupon the hearing was continued)
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MAY 28, 2010
JUDGE KATE TOOMEY
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification
may not be accurate with audio recordings.)
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Well, okay.

Development vs. Salt Lake County.

This the matter of B.A.M.
It's Case No. 980908157

and I note that counsel are all present.
Are you ready to proceed Mr. Homer?
MR. HOMER:

I am, Your Honor.

I have a preliminary

matter I'd like to propose, if I may?
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. HOMER:

Your Honor, in the (inaudible) of the

moment from yesterday and this goes to the Court's ruling on
the expert witness, I think we overlooked something and I
thought of this last night.

The Dolan decision from 1994 and

that's really a page of that, the Dolan decision puts the
burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the county's
exactions.

That burden is on the county and I've always

understood, that's been the law since 1994, 16 years and as
we, meaning myself and my client, put together our case last
summer to include the engagement of Mr. Smith.

Having :hat

in mind, that's why we characterized his expert witness as a
rebuttal witness.

Having that in mind then, as we thought

okay, here's the sequence of the case.

This is not in my
1
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opinion and this is probably what was forgotten by everybody
yesterday, this is not your normal plaintiff/defendant case.
We arguably have some burden somewhere, somehow and have had
that burden all the time it's been filed but the county under
Dolan which is the core issue per the remand instruction, the
county has that evidentiary burden and I have to be honest
with the Court, I lose track of those wordings, burden of
persuasion, burden of proof.

I'm not sure how all those

work, I'm not trying to dissuade the Court, I'm just saying
those are hard for me to distinguish and imagine.

The point

is is I believe the county has that forensic burden and in
that basis, that's why we put Mr. Smith down as a rebuttal
witness and that's why we've done that.

I have some other

arguments but if that solves it, does that softer the Court's

THE COURT:

You know, I thought about this all

night last night, well, not literally all night but virtually
all night.
MR. HOMER:

I did.

THE COURT:

And I really believe that I'm correct

in thinking notwithstanding that they have some burden, you
knew what they were going to present.
part of your case in chief.

This should have been

With that said, Mr. Smith has

assured me that there are things going to the testimony
yesterday from Mr. Nepstad that he will be refuting and I'm
2
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happy to hear that and I'm planning to hear that.
MR. HOMER:

Okay, I wanted - there are some other

ones Your Honor, but they - other reasons but I'll leave
them.
MR. HOMER:

We call Craig Smith.

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Smith, you're still

under oath.
THE WITNESS:

Thank you.
CRAIG SMITH

having been previously sworn, testified
upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed)
BY MR. HOMER:
Q

Mr. Smith, let me just start - let me start with

Mr. Nepstad's written report.
A

Do you have a copy of that?

I do but I think there's an exhibit.

easier for me if I could have the exhibit.
sitting right there.

It would be

I think it's 62,

I have it in my binder but that way I

won't have to flip back and forth between my report and his
report.
Q

Looking at his report, let's go to Page 8, marked

Page 8 of 8 and let me draw your attention initially to
conclusion number 3.

What would you say in response and

rebuttal to conclusion number 3 of Mr. Nepstad's?
A

No, I disagree with Mr. Nepstad's conclusion on the
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five percent, also on the - well, there are two levels that I
disagree with on that.

Let me try to explain the first one.

Mr. Nepstad, as I recall from his report, and these are going
to be round numbers, basically picked a number of 20,000
something trips per day and based on that concluded that the
B.A.M. portion is five percent because of the 488 trips per
day.

I don't disagree with the 488.

I'll use that number.

But what I do disagree with was I think he arbitrarily
selected the 20,000 trips per day.
correct number.

I don't think that's the

The number should be in my view 37,000 trips

per day and let me tell you what that's based on.

That's

based on testimony in one of the earlier trials from the UDOT
engineer, I believe her name was Andrea Poulis who testified
that when they build the six lanes to State Highway 171 it
will have a carrying capacity of 37,000 vehicles per day.

So

that's the number I believe should have been used instead of
the, if I can go to his, you know, numbers.
May I approach the exhibit?
THE COURT:

Yes, just remember to keep your voice

up so that the recording picks it up.
THE WITNESS:

Yeah, I've never had a problem with

not talking loud enough.

And this is, I can't remember

exactly, what is the number —
Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

I don't think that chart was ever

marked.
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A

Okay.

This is out of his report, it's Exhibit 62

and this is where he used, in 2020, 9,658 trips per day and
he's got a total plus the 1997 to come up with 23,000 trips
per day and then he used our 488 trips per day and said we'll
we're going to be five percent of that.

Well, my view of the

Nolan/Dolan and previous cases test is basically saying —
MR. HANSEN:

Judge, this is legal argument.

MR. HOMER:

It's not argument.

THE COURT:

Overruled.

objects let Mr. Homer respond.

Go ahead but when he
It's going to be very hard

for an attorney to do this, you're going to want to ]ump in,
but please don't.
THE WITNESS: I will. I'll try, Your Honor. I"ll try
my best. Is there a problem caused by development (inaudible)
solution and a - a problem and a solution. Well, B.A.M.
(inaudible) solution under the theory than they have to
participate and (inaudible) part of the 37,000 trip per day
solution that those extra (inaudible) are going to be from
the six lanes and so that's the proper number.

They're

participating in a 37,000 trip solution and so if I can sit
back down with my report.
In my report, I would try to do this math - I can't
really do this math because I'm not smart enough without
looking at it, that would mean that there's only 2.6 percent,
2.06 percent instead of five percent that's used by Mr.
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Nepstad and that 2.06 percent would equal - you v/ould change
the number to 139,023 and so when you compare these two
numbers, they aren't roughly equivalent because it's not
337,500 it's 137,000 should be used, what he's taken - he's
taking 351 instead of - he should only have had to pay the
137 instead of the 351.

So that's where the equivalency

drops off or proportionality, whatever you want to call it
because they've used the wrong, in my view, the wrong five
percent, it should be three percent.
MR. HANSEN:

Your Honor, may I renew my objection

and ask for a standing objection throughout the remainder of
this line of questioning.

What we just heard I zhink makes

clear that there is no new evidence coming in through this
witness.

This is legal argument.

This is really Mr. Homer's

closing argument that is now being made through this
testimony.
MR. HOMER:

Your Honor, I think it's rebuttal.

THE COURT:

He's got a standing objection.

MR. HOMER:

Okay.

You may

proceed.

Q

(BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, you heard Mr. Nepstad

testify concerning what he felt were the costs
funding sources of those costs?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Just the state taxes?
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and maybe the

A

I did.

Q

Did you also recall Ms. Bradshaw from UDOT

comptroller testify as to the amounts that were generated
with those taxation revenues?
A

Yeah.

Q

Against these costs then that would have been

testified to, is there a feature with regard to those
taxation revenues as perhaps impacting the actual costs that
UDOT would have?
A

Let's see, if I understand your - yeah, I mean,

UDOT, UDOT funds its projects through taxes.

Now, I know Mr.

Nepstad, well, I don't want to go beyond your question.

So

that's my answer to that question.
Q

Okay.

So in recognition of the general principle

that UDOT funds the taxes - or excuse me, funds its projects
using those revenues A

Right.

Q

— is the proportion of the taxes - and Ms. Bradshaw

said that of those taxation sources that we have, her
testimony was sales tax $119 million plus $150 million for
$269 million, fuel tax is $337 million, federal taxes shared
with the state, $322 million and the registration fees and
driver's license at $77 million for a total of one billion 25
million.
A

Right.
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1
2

Q

Against total revenues of $1.91 billion.

1005 numerator versus 1091 the denominator.

So it's

So 90 percent

approximately of those revenues are coming from those tax
sources.

Is that - is that fact that we had Ms. Bradshaw

5 I testify to, does that data then support or undermine,
6

significantly undermine, Mr. Nepstad's testimony concerning -

7

he just kind of ignored that aspect of things?

8

MR. HANSEN:

9

THE COURT:

Was that a question?

10

MR. HOMER:

I guess I'm asking okay, what's your

11

Objection, Your Honor -

comment to that.

12

THE COURT:

Mr. Hansen, you have an objection?

13

MR. HANSEN:

Yes, I do, Your Honor, thank you.

In

14

addition to the standing objection that we alreacy have on

15

the record, I (inaudible) but a slight different, and

16

additional ground.

17

questioning that has been pursued throughout the witnesses

18

including Ms. Bradshaw from UDOT, seems to involve a theory

This entire line of questioning and the

19 I or cause of action that is being asserted now for the first
20 I time in this case.

It has something to do with -- I'm not

21 J quite sure that I'm clear on it, I've heard Mr. Homer
22 j numerous times now refer to the Banbury Development case from
I
23 | 1981, has something to do with that, it has something to do
24 ' with some theory that taxpayers pay once for road
25 ' construction through fuel taxes and other taxes and then his
8
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client is being required to pay again through these
exactions, that there's some sort of double taxation that's
coming in here that is being asserted in this litigation for
the first time in 12 years.

It is inadmissible and I believe

irrelevant.
MR. HOMER:
true.

Your Honor, that is absolutely not

We have always asserted Banbury.

It was part of the

original letters that were asserted, it's part of the
lawsuit, you can read our pleading.
MR. HANSEN:
MR. HOMER:

Banbury has always —

Please do, actually.
- been part of this.

We had in our

motion last fall. It was heard in December by the Court.

In

fact, that was almost the key issue of the summary judgment
because the financing and all this discussion of cost got us
rethinking kind off the engineering side of this and onto the
money side.

But Banbury has always been there.

Banbury is

referred to in the very B.A.M. 3 decision, in the very
paragraph that we're talking about, it talks about the
Banbury idea.

It's not exactly on this financial question

but Banbury has always been part of the legal landscape and
to say that this is now a new claim is absolutely absurd,
Your Honor.

I don't want to go back through the mountains of

briefs we've written but I would bet you m

80 percent of

those, Banbury is referenced.
THE COURT:

I'm not betting with you, Mr. Homer.
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1

MR. HOMER:

I know.

2

THE COURT:

Mr. Hansen, I think that your - I'm

3 ' going to overrule your objection but I want to ask the
4 • parties to - I'm going to ask Mr. Homer to provide me with a
5 i written direction into the record where I can verify that he
i

6

has made this substantive argument.

7

about where have you cited the Banbury decision but where you

8

!

Now, I'm not talking

have made this argument.

9 •

And I will tell you and I have anticipated

10 - addressing this with you before the coxnclusion of the trial,
11 i so might as well do it now, that I really don't understand
12 { this theory.
13 ! it.

I have heaid you allude to it but I don't get

Now it hasn't been appropriate to make argument and it

!

14 ! won't be until it's time for closing argument, but I have no
15 | idea really, I mean, I've thought to myself, when it comes
16 ' time to address it in the findings and conclusions I don't
17

even know that you're talking about.

18
19
20

MR. HOMER:

Okay.

I can explain it if that will

THE COURT:

No, do in your closing, do it in your

help.

21

closing but as part of that, give me a paragraph showing me

22

where you made the claim, not just where you cited to the

23

Banbury decision but where you have articulated the argument

24

that you anticipate making at the end of this case.

25

MR. HANSEN:

Okay?

Thank you.
10
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THE COURT:
Q

Go ahead.

(BY MR. HOMER)

Mr. Smith, I think the question is,

in your report, do the elements you heard from Ms. Bradshaw,
this $1 million and change against 1. almost (inaudible) so
90 percent of the - does that affect how —
A

Well -

Q

— respond as the expert in direct response to Mr.

Nepstad' s position, it kind of doesn't matter we didn't
consider any of that.
A

Well, I'll give - my understanding may be different

than everybody else's in the courtroom too but THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

I don't know what his theory is.
I'll do my best to tell you what I

think is important about that whole line of discussion.

I

heard some comments earlier in the trial about equal
protection.

This is not in my understanding, we're not

talking about any equal protection.

What we're talking about

is underlying the Nolan/Dolan test that was adopted by
B.A.M., is this idea that one person should not be bearing
the cost that the public should bear as a whole.

My

understanding is that taxation system, that means the public
I as a whole bears the cost for the state roads and it's
inappropriate in my view to then as Mr. McCleary, B.A.M., to
bear a disproportionate amount of that cost other than being
a paid taxpayer.

That's probably the best way I can explain
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it.
Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

Mr. Smith, let me address your

attention then to the conclusion number 5.

In the first part

of that it seems like there is almost a legal conclusion, the
cost of the impact is roughly equivalent, do you recognize
that phrase roughly equivalent?
A

Yeah, and I don't think it's roughly equivalent for

the reason I stated a few minutes ago about the fact that his
numbers shouldn't be in the 300s, it should be in the 100s.
Also the fact that if you look at all the surrounding
developments, for some reason the county chose a exaction
system that requires certain individuals to participate and
others who get the same benefit because we're talking about
the problem being regional traffic.

That' s in the report by

Mr. Nepstad, he talks about the problem is regional traffic
that is being created by development in the area and yet if
your subdivision doesn't border on the state or county road,
you don't participate and in my view if you want to address a
regional traffic MR. HOMER:

Wait, he has an objection.

THE WITNESS:

I think I have a right to finish my

answer.
MR. HOMER:
MR. HANSEN:
Smith.

Hold on, hold on.
I'm not going to argue with you Mr.

Your Honor, I have an objection.

That's correct.
12
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THE COURT:

Mr. Hansen.

MR. HANSEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I'm going to

have reassert the objection because I understand I have a
standing objection but this is a new question and a new issue
so it's really not the same line of questioning.
THE COURT:

Yeah, and it sounds like argument and

i

; maybe Mr. Smith should have been doing the closing.

I don't

know but it sounds like closing argument.
MR. HOMER:

Okay.

MR. HANSEN:

That's my objection.

|

THE WITNESS:

,

MR. HOMER:

Well -

Hold on Craig.

!
i

Your Honor, here's the dilemma that I think we've
i set ourselves up to, this is a very fact intensive, law
! intensive issue, perhaps even more law intensive than
I normally would be the case.

For example, and I'll take 30

' seconds, if we were doing a malpractice case, the surgeon cut
off the wrong leg and the allegation was that that didn't
I meet the standard of care in the community for surgeons, that
supposedly is not just a medical question, cut off the leg,
but it's this legalistic question, does it meet the standard
of care.

So even though they're in the operating room there

is that law that is infused into that situation.
This case is way more infused with law than that
simple case, car accident, medical cut off the leg.
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This is
13

an intensely legal issue.

In that context you can see right

in his own report that Mr. Nepstad, sorry, can't keep his
name straight, Mr. Nepstad, and the one we're talking about
right now, 5, the cost of the impact is roughly equivalent.
Now I don't suppose that he just stumbled on that wording.
THE COURT:

All right, but look, I'm not taking

that as a term of art.

I'm taking that as his comparison of

the two figures and then using that, using that phrase to
say, you know, I've looked at the two figures.

If Mr. Smith

has an opinion that the figures are wrong, he can tell us why
he thinks they're wrong but I do not want to continue hearing
argument from him.

Q

MR. HOMER:

Well -

THE COURT:

That's my ruling.

MR. HOMER:

All right.

(BY MR. HOMER)

Let me turn you, Mr. Smith to your

report.
A

Okay.

Q

You have it on Page 3 now.

You've had an

i introductory analysis and we won't go there.

On Paragraph 1

! of your report, would you read what that paragraph says?
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Objection.
Yeah, we're not using the report.

' not receiving the report.

I'm

He can tell me things that are in

i it to the extent that they are rebuttal to Mr. Nepstad's
i

:

14
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1

testimony.

2 ,

Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

Paragraph 1 in general in one

3

sentence describe then what you think the essence of your now

4

testimony will be?

What topic are we talking about in the

5 | context of rebutting Mr. Nepstad's testimony?
6 i

MR. HANSEN:

7 '

THE COURT:

I mean a real question, Mr. Homer.

MR. HOMER:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Look, you seem to be inviting this

8

!

Your Honor -

i

i

9 j
10

witness and he's an accomplished man with a lot to say but

11 i you seem to be inviting him to make a speech.

I need you to

!

12 | ask him a question that he can just respond to and not just a

I
13

share your thoughts.

14 |

MR. HOMER:

Not an open ended - okay.

15 i

THE COURT:

It needs to be a question.

16

Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

Under the concepts that are

17 ! embodied under Paragraph 1 of your report on Page 3, Mr.
18 ' Smith, tell us then what your comments would be in rebuttal
19 > to Mr. Nepstad's —
20

THE COURT:

Mr. Homer, you're doing the same thing.

21

MR. HOMER:

That's too open?

22 .

THE COURT:

You're just doing the same thing.

23

MR. HOMER:

Okay, let me see if I can...

24
25

Q

(BY MR. HOMER) Skipping to Page 4 as far as the

lane widening goes, the first full paragraph.
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Would you

15

comment to your comments to his comments on the land
widening?
A

Well, I think Mr. Nepstad testified that he

believed that there was a need for six lanes at some point in
the future.

My view is that's so far off in the future

that's speculative under the impacting ordinance which in my
view is kind of same thing with a different, instead of
exacting things you're exacting money.

You have to do things

within six years and so my view is that's speculative about
the need for six lanes.
Q

Okay.

With regard to Paragraph 2 of your report,

also on Page 4, in the context of these improvements that
were required as testified to by Mr. Nepstad, why then do you
have this quantitative belief that those were excessive?
A

I think it's excessive because the B.A.M.

Development is such a small part of the overall picture that
that makes, the over picture, what I mean by that, is, there
are - it adds so few cars, this is a state highway, this is
going to be improved according to state plans anyway and you
really don't take into consideration one development versus
the other hundreds of developments around there.
MR. HANSEN:
Honor.

Objection, and motion to strike, Your

I'm sorry, but it's the same thing.

This is exactly

what we anticipated.
Your Honor, let me say this and I'm sorry to take
16
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1

the Court's time.

As I understand the law, there are only

2

two occasions in which an attorney may act as an expert

3

witness, where the standard of care is at issue in a medical

4

malpractice situation, the question is to a specific area of

5

the law and the standard of care (inaudible).
Second is with respect to attorney's fees and the

6
7

reasonableness.

In this case Mr. Smith is and always has

8

been an attorney.

9

The testimony that he just provided and has provided thus far

He is acting as an advocate in this case.

10

in this case had not been factual.

11

technical, it has not been scientific.

12

witness.
THE COURT:

13

It has not been
He is not an expert

Yeah, and I will add that attorneys are

also sometimes expert witnesses in attorney discipline cases.

14
15

MR. HANSEN:

16

THE COURT

Attorney discipline cases.

17

MR. HOMER

Your Honor —

18

THE COURT

But -

19

MR. HOMER

— excuse me I didn't mean to cut you

THE COURT:

It's just my (inaudible).

MR. HOMER:

Your Honor, the -

20

I'm sorry?

off.

21
22 ;
ii

23 I

THE COURT: But Mr. Homer I know your argument, I've

i

24 j heard it over and over again and I have to say that I think
25 j that Mr. Hansen is correct and I have tried to give you some
17
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latitude with this but I'm not hearing proper rebuttal
testimony as to facts from Mr. Smith.

That is to say, I

haven't heard it and I have tried mightily to craft a
situation where you would have an opportunity to say what you
want to say but we're getting no further with this.
MR. HOMER:

We're getting no further, Your Honor,

because I think the Court, has abandoned part of what we
started out here a few days ago and it was kind of an open,
let it all come in and then I'll sort it out.
THE COURT:

He should have been designated as a

witness in your case in chief if that was what you wanted to
do with his report and I'm not hearing appropriate rebuttal.
So, I do not think that continuing this is going to be
fruitful.
So, with our thanks to Mr. Smith and apologies for
the inconvenience, I think this is the end unless you have
something else that you can...
MR. HOMER:

Well, I have some other questions that

I think are not as Mr. Hansen seemingly is chafing over, they
are not legal opinions but they would go to things in his
role as a city attorney, as a practitioner —
THE COURT:

Well, you can try one of those.

But

for example, when I hear B.A.M. is a small part of the area
and won't contribute that much, he's not an expert on traffic
flow, he's not an expert on that sort of thing.

If you have
18
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one, I would hear it.

I mean, that certainly seems like that

would be a good thing to have testimony on if that was where
you were going with it, but Mr. Smith doesn't do that kind of
work.
MR. HOMER:

Okay.

Let me see if I can change

horses.
Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

Mr. Smith, in your role as City

Attorney in Park City and furthermore in your role as
practitioner, private practitioner, counseling clients and
having clients come to you in these kinds of cases, okay, in
the context of could this land - and this goes to - well,
both Nepstad's testimony and Mr. Dudley's testimony, probably
more for Dudley and in my opinion as the rebuttal, we didn't
say rebuttal only to Mr. Nepstad, you know, we said rebuttal
witness even though he addressed Nepstad's report —
THE COURT:

Can you just finish the question, Mr.

MR. HOMER:

Okay.

Homer?

Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

Is it possible that had this ground

been reserved, in other words, this excess from the 53-foot
line (inaudible) line is going to be, could that have been
reserved in some way such that it would still stay in
B.A.M.'s situation, in B.A.M.'s ownership?
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Objection, relevance.
Overruled.
19
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THE WITNESS:

Certainly.

I mean, yeah, it

certainly could have been reserved in my - should have and
could have been reserved and has value as land.
Q

(BY MR. HOMER)

And in that same regard, has value,

what would that value be in the context of that ownership
interest?
A

Well, as I recall the expert yesterday, not Mr.

Nepstad, the other expert, I'm trying to think of his name.
Q

Dudley.

A

Dudley, he basically at least as I understood his

testimony said, Well that has no income, has no value.
disagree with that.

I

Every land has value for lots of

different reasons.
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:
Q

Objection, qualifications.
Overruled, go ahead and answer.

(BY MR. HOMER)

In that context then, could it have

been set up legally had the.county allowed that B.A.M. would
have held onto that property and then when UDOT finally, if
and when did develop that he would be paid —
A

Sure -

Q

— under condemnation principles?

A

— that happens all the time.

Q

Okay.

Mr. Dudley also testified that - and that a

24 i land developer is obligated or at least in his opinion this
25

is how they do it, constantly monitor the relative situation
20
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1 ; as he's dealing with the government and as that economic
i

2 I situation changes, that developer is to evaluate it and
3 | perhaps abandon the project.

That's not my question yet.

In

4 ! the B.A.M. case Mr. McCleary was tied into the land purchase
5 | from the School Lands Trust, did you hear that?
6 1

A

I recall that testimony, yes.

7

Q

Had, had the - well, just let me say this, in light

8

of the testimony you heard from Mr. McCleary, could he then

9 j have abandoned the contractual obligation that he quite
10 I possibly had consummated and as an attorney, what would that
11 j have been to him in making that decision?
12

I'm asking you

that in your attorney role, in your private attorney role,

13 j not as a legal conclusion just how does the world work in
14

that setting?

15 j
16

A

Well, you know, oftentimes you hear the old saying,

legislation is like making sausage, it's not a very pretty

17 I process.

The same thing is true with land entitlement

18 I processes.

It's not a process in my experience that

19 I sometimes make any sense.
20

People are required to do things

they shouldn't be required, they do them because they hope

21 j they can make a profit.

You know, as long as they hope to

22 | make a profit they'11 do a lot of things that the county may
23 ; ask or the city may ask that may be proper, improper, legal,
24 j illegal but obviously the developer, you know, buys property
25 j and then believes based on zoning that's in place and other

I

21
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things that they can make money and that's why they go
forward.
Q

I'm not sure that answered my question.

A

I must not have understood it.

Q

Here's my question.

In Mr. McCleary case where he

was locked into the purchase of the land —
A

Yeah, he should have - yeah.

Q

— what as a practical matter in that context could

he do, what would happen perhaps legally to him if he said no
to the original land purchase?
A

You know, when your back is against the wall you

can do a couple of things and the one thing he did is
asserted his rights against the county.

The other thing he

could have done is try to get out of the deal with
(inaudible) and suffer the consequences there.

Obviously

from us being here today, 12 years later, probably neither
one is a very good option for Mr. McCleary and that's why
we're here (inaudible).
Q

Mr. Smith, you were the City Attorney in Park City?

A

Right.

Q

And for what years?

A

I was assistant, both assistant and then I was

later city attorney from 1984 to 1989 and then I came back
while they were looking for a new attorney and acted as the
city attorney in the 1990 for about a 7-month period of time
22
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while they were looking for a new city attorney.
Q

And you're the attorney for Corinne City which is

Box Elder County?
A

That's right.

Q

And then several Emery County —

A

Yeah.

Q

— communities.

A

And Duchesne County which is (inaudible).

Q

In your experience having been involved in

municipal law for the entirety of your practice?
A

That would be correct, yes.

Q

How many situations are you aware of where the

state has abandoned and essentially dumped on the local
government what formally had been a state roadway?
A

Yeah, I heard the testimony yesterday about roads

being transferred, how that happens.

My experience is it's a

very rare - my experience is very rare for a state highway to
become either a county road or a city street.

It happens but

it's like, you know, winning the Kentucky Derby basically.
Q

Are you familiar where any situations where that

has happened?
A

I've never had one from all my experience and

clients where a single state highway has become a county road
or a city street because typically that takes the legislature
to act and so I would —
23
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Q

Would it be a negotiated process or would it be

characterized as dumping?

I know that's not a real artful

term —
A

I mean —
MR. HANSEN:
MR. HOMER:

Q

Objection, vague and ambiguous.
Let me try again.

(BY MR. HOMER)

Would there be prior negotiations

as part of that legislative process?
A

Yeah, I think that's what Mr. Nepstad testified to.

Maybe he didn't testify to it but sure it can happen.
of things can happen.

Lots

We can speculate for all day on what

might happen in the future.

I don't think that's a very

profitable thing for us to do and, you know.
Q

In your experience coming back to this blue chart

you referred to, the bar graph and your testimony is it's not
high enough on the top end to reflect a (inaudible)?
A

Right, yeah.

Q

That's my focus. Here's that question, what is your

opinion having been what you have been and are, on his
arbitrary - won't say arbitrary, his selecting the date 2020
which is 22 years after the fact —
A

Well -

Q

Hold on.

A

Okay.

Q

- arbitrarily selecting that date 2020 and then it
24
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1

would say okay there would be the 23,000 trips on that date

2

as compared to the overall carrying capacity (inaudible).

3

Talk about dates.

4

MR. HANSEN:

5

MR. HOMER:

Talk about dates, talk about the date

THE COURT:

I don't -

6

Object -

selection.

7

MR. HANSEN:

Objection, mischaracterization as to

arbitrary selection.
MR. HOMER:

10
11

I tried to come off the arbitrary, Your

Honor, delete the arbitrary.
THE COURT:

Yeah, but I didn't even understand the

14

MR. HOMER:

Okay.

15

THE COURT:

So -

16

MR. HOMER:

Mr. Smith -

17

THE COURT:

- can you - Mr. Homer, can you just

12
13

18

question.

boil it down?

19
20
21

MR. HOMER:
Q

Let me try.

(BY MR. HOMER)

Here's the bar graph, here's the

existing, here's the new and your position I think a minute

22 I ago was the green part of the graph is not tall enough.
23 |

A

Yeah, what I

24 j

Q

Hold on, was not tall enough, correct? Yes or no.

25 |

A

Yes.
25
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Q

Okay.

Talk strictly to Mr. Nepstad's selection of

that 2020 date as being the major one that cuts off
(inaudible).
A

Yeah, he picked a date of 23 years.

there's anything scientific about that.

I don't think

The things I've

read—
MR. HANSEN:
foundation.

Your Honor, excuse me sir, objection,

This witness does not have the ability to speak

to the scientific accuracy of Mr. Nepstad's selection of
research material and data.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

If he would have picked

another one, I'll allow him to testify to that and why.
THE WITNESS:
MR. HOMER:

Well -

Hold on, hold on.

THE WITNESS:
MR. HOMER:
Q

Can I answer that question?
Hold on, hold on.

(BY MR. HOMER)

Did you understand the Judge's

remark?
A

I did.

Q

If that were formulated as a question from me,

could you answer that question, yes or no?
A

Yes, I would have picked another day.

Q

Okay.

A

Well, yeah, what I would have picked is the 37,000

Would you then answer that question?

is the number I picked.
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Q

And not even tie it to a date but tie it to a

quantity?
A

That's the solution, yes.
MR. HOMER:
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

I think that's all I have.
No questions.
All right.

Thank you.

Do you have any

other witnesses you intend to call?
MR. HOMER:

I do, Your Honor, can I just have a

second with Mr. McCleary?
We call Scott McCleary in rebuttal.
THE COURT:
oath.

Okay.

Mr. McCleary, you're still under

You might want to take some water with you.

We don't

seem to have a bailiff today.
We're stretched so thin these days and you may have
noticed yesterday that it was fairly loud coming through that
wall.

There were a lot of people in the holding cells for my

colleague in that direction and my colleague in this
direction has a jury trial and when there' s a jury there has
to be a bailiff on duty all the time.

So anyway, apologize

for the lack of attention to everybody's comfort.
This reminds though, were you guys able to —
MR. HOMER:

Yes, we did, Your Honor, we've got that

worked out to our satisfaction.
THE COURT:

Good, okay.

You may proceed.

MR. HOMER:

We tentatively marked it as
27
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